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Chapter 1
Introduction
Traditionally, operating system security in practice has largely focused on inter-process
isolation: limiting a process’s access to shared system resources or resources owned by
another process. In contrast, there are usually no restrictions on memory access between
different components within the same process. An executable and set of libraries in the same
process both have full access to each other’s resources, which violates the principle of least
privilege and can exacerbate the impact of security bugs. For example, an application that
uses a cryptography library may never need to access encryption keys directly, yet a security
vulnerability in the application (or any of its libraries) could still allow an attacker to access
the encryption keys used by the cryptography library even if the library has no bugs of its
own. This is not just theoretical; in 2017, a bug in an HTML parser leaked internal private
keys used by a major CDN provider [8]. In a similar case, the infamous Heartbleed bug,
an out-of-bounds memory access vulnerability in the packet parsing code of OpenSSL [11],
saw widespread real-world exploitation [1]. This potential exposure necessitated expensive
key rotations for thousands of websites [29]. In both cases, private keys were exposed even
though the actual vulnerable code resided in subroutines that never handled cryptographic
keys.
Intra-process isolation hopes to improve on this situation by enforcing finer-grained
separation of resources. Various proposals have offered solutions for limiting access to
designated memory regions to “components” such as particular threads, libraries, or even
arbitrary snippets of code [77, 59, 53, 52, 46]. However, most of them suffer from one of
1

two problems: high overhead during execution, or high cost of switching between isolated
components [72]. Recently, two concurrent works, called Hodor [38] and ERIM [72], set
forth unique hardware-assisted intra-process memory isolation. These two systems achieve
dramatically lower overhead by exploiting “memory protection keys for userspace”, a new
hardware feature available in some recent x86 processors [43]. Protection keys for userspace
(often abbreviated as either PKU or MPK) incur no significant overhead during ordinary
execution and only a small cost when switching between components [72].
While these hardware-assisted intra-process isolation systems seem to provide the “best
of both worlds” by offering finer-grained access control within a single process at very
low overhead, their design also presents a unique threat model and attack surface. This
threat model uniquely assumes that the attacker is able to execute nearly arbitrary machine
code in the untrusted component even though, from the kernel’s perspective, the untrusted
component has the same privileges as the trusted component. While the sandbox does
monitor and restrict certain syscalls, this approach of retrofitting a new security boundary
onto the kernel by syscall interception is error-prone and difficult to formally analyze. Syscalls
that are known to break intra-process security boundaries are blocked on an ad-hoc basis,
but there is no guarantee that no dangerous kernel interface is overlooked. Starting from
this observation, we develop the following contributions:
• Demonstrate, classify, and analyze a variety of novel vulnerabilities affecting hardwareassisted intra-process isolation relying on static code invariants;
• Analyze the root cause of these vulnerabilities in terms of flawed assumptions, kernel
threat model discrepancies, and practical challenges of secure implementation for
security retrofitting;
• More closely examine the WˆX assumption in the context of academic security
literature, showing how its usual conception is not borne out by reality;
• Generalize one attack technique developed for intra-process isolation, demonstrating
how it can bypass fully-precise control-flow integrity (CFI) with shadow stacks under
realistic circumstances;
2

• Design and prototype the xlock system, which attempts to bring real-world systems
into line with the WˆX as it is commonly used, using a development model that
emphasizes architecturally preventing whole classes of known attacks;
• Design and prototype a hybrid model (coprocesses) for intra-process isolation that
continues to exploit userspace-only context switches for efficiency while also informing
the kernel of intra-process security boundaries;
• Demonstrate that the coprocess prototype has an acceptable performance cost in a
realistic application, protecting long-term private keys in memory for a web sever
running SSL.

1.1

Evaluating the Security of PKU-based Sandboxes

In the first section of this work, we evaluate the security of proposed PKU-based sandboxes
in a realistic context, and find that both systems are vulnerable to similar classes of software
attacks. We group the attacks into a few families of issues: subverting memory access
permissions; modifying code by rearranging mappings, controlling PKRU through the kernel,
race conditions, interfering with non-memory process resources, and changing permissions
directly. We detail several practical exploits that circumvent the isolation promised by
the system and allow the untrusted component to access all protected memory. In many
cases, an identical attack works against both systems, ERIM and Hodor. Using prototype
code available for ERIM, we tested 10 proof-of-concept exploits (listed later in Table 3.1)
and found that all of them succeeded in accessing protected memory from an untrusted
component. We also expect eight of these attacks to succeed against Hodor with minimal
changes.
Our attacks exploit flawed assumptions shared by both systems, such as accessing PKUprotected memory through the kernel, modifying in-process code that is presumed to be
immutable, or manipulating the behavior of a trusted component in unexpected ways.
These issues do not represent bugs in the Linux kernel or in PKU’s design or hardware
implementation. Instead, we argue that these attacks stem from a common root cause: the

3

threat model for secure in-process isolation is fundamentally at odds with the
threat model of the PKU feature and the Linux kernel. PKU can be controlled with
an unprivileged instruction and so is not designed to protect against malicious code that
intends to elevate its own privileges. Meanwhile, the Linux kernel has a highly permissive
process model which allows processes a great deal of control over their own resources and
operation. Thus, Linux kernel developers have made no attempt at absolute enforcement
of PKU permissions [37]. Consequently, we discover and exploit a large attack surface of
unprivileged syscalls affecting intra-process resources which can interfere with the security
guarantees of a PKU-based sandbox. For example, the Linux syscall process vm readv
intentionally allows an unprivileged process to read its own memory without checking PKU
permissions.
We discuss possible mitigations and measure their potential impact on performance. We
show that ERIM’s [72] ptrace-based sandbox, which implements the sandbox without kernel
changes, incurs substantially higher performance penalties when we extend it to monitor
syscalls that could otherwise be used to bypass the secure isolation. Some of the attacks
detailed in Section 3.2 use only standard I/O syscalls, which are frequently used by legitimate
applications and are thus expensive to monitor. Merely adding a check to monitor the
open syscall decreases measured throughput by over 50% compared to ERIM’s previously
reported benchmarks on a web server [72]. This suggests that current userspace-only
design for PKU-based intra-process isolation may require a steep performance penalty to
operate securely without kernel changes. As a result, we conclude that secure solution to
intra-process isolation requires at least some architectural changes.

1.2

Generalizing Memory Permissions Model Attacks

Our findings of flawed assumptions in hardware-assisted intra-process isolation systems raise
another question: are these assumptions shared in other proposed systems or research
prototypes? And if so, what are the security implications to the systems founded on the
same assumptions? We discuss how the widely-used WˆX assumption does not entirely hold

4

on Linux, and that this gap results in realistic attacks to bypass fine-grained control-flow
integrity (CFI) systems.

1.2.1

The WˆX Assumption

In particular, the WˆX assumption is shared by many proposed exploit mitigation
systems [14, 60, 32]. The assumption is usually formulated as a guarantee that code cannot
be modified at runtime. Abadi et al’s seminal 2005 article Control-Flow Integrity provides
an example for how the assumption is typically posed [14]:
NWC Non-Writable Code: It must not be possible for the program to modify
code memory at runtime... NWC is already true on most current systems, except
during the loading of dynamic libraries and runtime code-generation.
This assumption comprises two parts. First, it simply states process code cannot be modified
at runtime. Second, it asserts that this assumption (at least usually) holds on modern
operating systems. Other works in the literature use a similar assumption, either implicitly
or stated explicitly [14, 60, 32].
Of course, this view is a slightly simplified model of memory permissions. Modern tool
chains do generally produce applications without any writable and executable regions by
default [2]. As long as the application does not make any changes to memory mappings,
this property prevents any userspace memory access from directly modifying executable
code. But, it is well-known that applications can mark new memory regions as executable at
runtime. On Linux, the most obvious ways involve modifying page permissions using mmap
or mprotect, but we also identify a variety of less obvious methods in Section 3.2.
Therefore, the WˆX property as it exists on Linux is better understood as a narrow
property governing individual userspace memory accesses, rather than a comprehensive
policy guaranteeing code integrity. SELinux provides access controls that can deny some
methods of modifying code at runtime [12, 68], but even these controls cannot guarantee
total code integrity through the lifetime of a process (see Section 5.6 for details).
In contrast to the complexities of WˆX in practice, references to the WˆX assumption
in the literature often treat it as a simple guarantee of code immutability. Thus, a gap
5

exists between WˆX as it commonly implemented on real systems and as it is commonly
used in the literature. This difference is not just theoretical. Many of our bypasses against
PKU-based memory isolation exploit differences between the WˆX model and reality.
In exploring the implications of this imperfect assumption, a natural next target is
control-flow integrity (CFI). CFI systems rely on the WˆX assumption [14, 60, 70, 80, 75],
but they also use a stricter threat model compared to intra-process isolation. Intra-process
isolation threat models presume that the attacker can launch a control-flow hijacking attack,
while CFI models do not (since control-flow hijacking is exactly what CFI sets out to prevent).
Therefore, extending our exploits to CFI systems is non-trivial as it requires us to work in
a more constrained threat model.

1.2.2

Control-Flow Integrity

As WˆX policies became more ubiquitous, attackers shifted towards code reuse attacks to
sidestep these protections. In a code reuse attack, attackers hijack the program’s control flow,
transferring execution through a series of small snippets of existing program code (known
as gadgets) to achieve a desired outcome. Each gadget consists of an existing chunk of code
that contains some pertinent instructions (e.g. pop or mov) followed by an instruction that
allows the attacker to direct control flow to the next link in the chain (e.g. ret or an indirect
branch). In the absence of additional protections, typical programs and libraries contain
many thousands of such gadgets, generally enabling Turing-complete computation by the
attacker [66].
CFI is a potential mitigation for code reuse attacks [70, 80, 75, 78, 60, 14]. It protects socalled “forward-edges” (indirect branches) by instrumenting them with additional code that
validates the branch target before taking the branch. Fully-precise static CFI would allow
only branches that exist in the static control-flow graph of the program, but real-world CFI
implementations are not fully-precise. Instead, practical CFI implementations approximate
the possible control-flow graph of a program to varying degrees of precision [22]. Fully-precise
CFI, then, serves as an idealized model for the “best possible” static CFI policy.
Shadow stacks [20, 28, 67] protect the “backward edge” (stored return addresses) from
tampering, either by hiding them at an unpredictable address [48, 54] or restricting access
6

via hardware such as the MMU [20, 43]. Each function return accesses the shadow stack and
uses it to validate the return pointer before branching to it.
When used together, CFI and shadow stacks attempt to constrain program execution,
even in the face of an attacker with full read and write access to the program’s address space.
All branches, or forward edges, are limited by CFI to jump only to a target that is valid for
that branch. All return instructions, or backward edges, are validated to only return to the
correct call site.

1.2.3

The proc/mem Attack

One of the attacks developed against PKU-based intra-process isolation exploited access
to the proc/self/mem pseudo-file in Linux’s procfs filesystem, a file-like interface to a
process’s own virtual address space. We show how this method can be repurposed to bypass
fully-precise CFI with shadow stacks. The attack depends on certain data-oriented gadgets,
which find exist in both Nginx [10] and the GNU standard C library (glibc). We develop
a proof-of-concept exploit using this technique against a simulated vulnerability in Nginx,
and show how it can be used to inject arbitrary machine code into executable memory at
runtime without violating any constraint of fine-grained CFI or shadow stacks.

1.3

Mitigations

We have identified substantial challenges in designing and implementing secure intra-process
isolation, but the situation is not hopeless. We divide these challenges into two principal
problems: securing static code invariants via runtime code integrity; and mitigating confused
deputy attacks from the kernel. We address the former via a set of kernel patches designed to
implement the WˆX assumption, which then form the foundation for a modified intra-process
isolation design addressing the latter.

7

1.3.1

WˆX Violations

In Section 5, we design and implement a prototype framework for protecting runtime code
integrity, called the xlock system. This system is intended to bridge the gaps between
the WˆX in theory and practice. xlock provides a simple interface in the form of a single
system call that allows a process to “lock” its own code. We combine two techniques to
systematically and comprehensively address the existing loopholes: first, we rule out an
entire class of attacks by converting all executable memory to private, anonymous mapping;
and second, we use static analysis to uncover kernel code paths that reach potential WˆX
violations and augment them with new access checks. We then test, measure, and discuss
the performance impact of xlock.

1.3.2

Confused Deputies

In current PKU-based intra-process isolation designs, when a dangerous kernel interface is
overlooked, this leads to a novel class of vulnerabilities that use the kernel as a “confused
deputy” to break intra-process isolation. One intra-process component may cause the kernel
to take actions on its behalf that allow it to access resources from another component.
Crucially, these actions do not represent kernel bugs because they are intended behavior
for the kernel, which does not recognize security boundaries within a process. Instead, the
vulnerabilities arise from the incongruities in the kernel and sandbox security models.
Rather than try to scour millions of lines of kernel code for potential violations of the
intra-process security model, we propose a fix that divides intra-process components along
existing security boundaries. To this end, we design a system that allows the kernel to
associate each intra-process component with a largely independent process control block,
as if the component were a separate process. We call these virtual processes coprocesses
because they exist alongside the process originating them, the primary process. Intra-process
component switches remain entirely in userspace, and thus retain the associated performance
benefits. When the process does make a context switch to the kernel (for a system call,
interrupt, or similar event), the kernel accesses the PKRU register to identify the current
component, and uses the associated coprocess for essentially all subsequent operations.
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1.4

Outline

The remainder of this dissertation is divided into four main chapters.

In Chapter 2,

we provide the necessary background information for understanding the implementation
details of existing intra-process isolation systems. The following chapter details several
vulnerabilities common to ERIM and Hodor, two recent and efficient iterations on intraprocess isolation that use PKU hardware to enforce memory isolation.
In Chapter 4 we expand on the imperfect WˆX assumption that underly many of these
vulnerabilities, and generalize one of the techniques to undermine this assumption to bypass
control-flow integrity. Chapter 5 puts forward a possible mitigation, the xlock system, that
reinforces the WˆX assumption on Linux to prevent this attack.
Finally, Chapter 6 introduces a new hybrid model for intra-process isolation that combines
efficient userspace context switches with kernel abstractions to provide strong isolation of
non-memory resources. In combination with the xlock system, we argue that this design
addresses known weaknesses in intra-process isolation in a way that is both efficient and
reduces the likelihood of further implementation flaws.
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Chapter 2
Background: Intra-process Isolation
Modern operating systems must provide a stable platform for a complex userspace
application ecosystem. For this reason, the kernel carefully restricts interactions between
processes. Process-specific resources - including register state and virtual address space - are
opaque and inaccessible from other userspace processes. This inter-process isolation provides
fault-tolerance by preventing application failures from cascading to unrelated processes and
limits the scope of vulnerabilities and bugs. An attacker who compromises one running
application ought not be able to leverage their position to peer into (or modify) another
application’s private memory space.
Isolation within an application could provide similar benefits at greater efficiency.
Sensitive data in an application component (for example, the cryptographic library in a
webserver) could be insulated from security vulnerabilities elsewhere in the application.
However, simply placing application components in separate processes (or other context
abstractions) can incur significant performance penalties (see [72] Section 6.5, and [38]
Section 4.1). This performance cost is high because, despite their conceptual segregation,
processes rely on the same underlying hardware for execution. Switching to a new active
process generally requires that the kernel flush the transaction lookaside buffer (TLB)
and restore the process’ context, including its register state and virtual memory space.
These considerations motivate more lightweight techniques for segmenting memory between
components with varied levels of trust/access.
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2.1

Related Work

Researchers have designed many systems providing some form of lightweight isolation within
a process, with varying performance and security characteristics.

2.1.1

Kernel Abstractions

Some proposed systems propose novel kernel abstractions to facilitate low-cost switching
between memory views, including shreds [25] and light-weight contexts (lwCs) [52]. Like
threads, processes may own many lwCs, but these abstractions are not scheduling-related.
Instead, each lwC carries its own (potentially overlapping) set of resources, including memory
mappings. lwC switches are twice as fast as traditional context switches [52].
Wedge [17] introduces several new kernel concepts including sthreads (the application
components), tags (permissions and memory objects), and callgates (predefined component
entry points), and uses system calls for component switches. By default, an sthread cannot
access any memory, file descriptor, system call, or call gate; instead, permissions for each
of these resources must be individually granted by the programmer. These default-deny
semantics prevent all attacks described in this work by default. However, our work does
suggest that it may be difficult for a developer to predict which system calls may lead to
isolation bypasses.

2.1.2

VMFUNC

Intel’s VT-x virtualization extensions allow for unprivileged switching between extended
page tables. MemSentry-VMFUNC [46], Hodor-VMFUNC [38], and SeCage [53] leverage
this capability to present alternate memory views to trusted and untrusted application
components. MemSentry-VMFUNC and SeCage require CFI to defend against an in-process
adversary, while Hodor-VMFUNC uses dual-mapped trampolines for this purpose.
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2.1.3

Static and Dynamic Bounds Checking

Type-safe programming languages [58] provide isolation via validity checks on memory
accesses. These protections can prevent some bugs and security vulnerabilities, but they
require the use of specific languages and do not apply to many existing software products.
These languages are also sometimes unsuited to domains that require direct resource
management by the programmer.
Software fault isolation (SFI) [74, 77, 23] can retrofit unsafe languages with similar checks,
but at a significant performance penalty. Systems such as NativeClient [77] block all syscalls
from the untrusted component and so are not vulnerable to any of the issues we describe in
this paper. Read/write protection with MemSentry-SFI, a recent implementation, increased
average runtime across activities in the SPEC CPU2006 benchmark suite by roughly
20% [46]. Hardware-supported checks (e.g. Intel MPX [43]) offer improved performance but
still have significant runtime costs [64], and in some cases are vulnerable to Meltdown-based
attacks [21]. SFI techniques also typically require a mechanism for control flow integrity
(CFI) [14, 60, 75, 70, 80, 73, 79] to prevent in-process adversaries from simply bypassing
bounds checks. CFI adds additional overhead, however; a recent MPX-backed technique
introduced 9%-28% runtime overhead on SPEC CPU2006 activities [79]. A number of
exploits in the literature challenge CFI system security [30, 33, 22].

2.1.4

Probabilistic Isolation

Probabilistic isolation techniques obscure a process’ memory layout to hide sensitive regions
like system libraries.

A well-deployed example is address space layout randomization

(ASLR) [69, 54]. While full ASLR can mitigate buffer overflow attacks, an entire family of
effective side-channel bypasses [41, 36, 31, 35] casts doubt on the security of such approaches.

2.1.5

Trusted Execution

Trusted enclaves like ARM’s TrustZone [15] and Intel’s Software Guard Extensions (SGX) [42]
provide yet another solution for cordoning sensitive software regions.
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The protections

afforded by these enclaves are robust (even kernel snooping is prohibited), but they are
a heavyweight solution inappropriate for many applications [82], and can be vulnerable to
side-channel attacks [34].
IMIX [32] and Microstache [59] are proposals to add instructions to the x86 ISA for
isolating memory regions within a process.

However, to defend against an in-process

adversary, these extensions require CFI protection or code integrity.

2.2

Protection Keys for Userspace (PKU)

ERIM and Hodor use a relatively new hardware feature called Intel Protection Keys for
Userspace (PKU) [43] to mediate memory access between in-process components. With
PKU, memory access permissions can be changed directly in userspace in as little as 20
cycles. This overhead is an order of magnitude faster than the context switch required for a
system call [72].
The PKU feature allows a process to control its own access to memory by tagging
individual pages with a domain and governing access to each domain via a special register
known as the Protection Key Rights for Userspace Pages, or PKRU[43]. The PKRU register
can be written from userspace with the unprivileged wrpkru instruction.
This unprivileged access is a double-edged sword. On the one hand, it lets the process
quickly modify memory access rules without invoking the kernel; on the other, it creates a
problem for secure isolation. If an attacker exploits a vulnerability to gain control over one
component, PKU’s design does not prevent the attacker from executing code that writes
to the PKRU register, allowing access to any domain. For this reason, PKU does not
provide secure isolation on its own. An earlier system using PKU for in-process isolation,
MemSentry-PKU [46], thus required additional protection such as CFI to prevent an attacker
from simply changing their own memory access permissions.
Hodor and ERIM both address this problem by augmenting PKU with a software sandbox
that aims to prevent components from making unauthorized changes to the PKRU register.
We collectively refer to these systems as “PKU-based sandboxes”. At a high level, both
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systems detect wrpkru instructions in application and library code, and effectively neutralize
all wrpkru instructions except ones that are immediately followed by either code that safely
transfers control to a designated entry point of the trusted component or code that returns
to the untrusted component (after validating the state of the PKRU register). The sandbox
then monitors and restricts certain syscalls made by the process to prevent an untrusted
component from introducing new executable code that violates these rules. We discuss the
designs of ERIM and Hodor in more detail in Section 2.

2.2.1

Intel PKU

The PKU feature (available in Skylake or later Intel server processors since 2017 [43])
regulates memory accesses based on the state of a new 32-bit register, the PKRU
register [43]. When PKU is enabled, each virtual memory page mapped by a process is
associated with exactly one of 16 different regions or protection keys. Each key is associated
with 2 bits in the PKRU register which controls access to reads and/or writes for that region.
On each memory access, a hardware check compares the protection key of the accessed page
with the state of the corresponding bits in the PKRU register in order to determine if the
access is allowed. New rdpkru and wrpkru x86 instructions allow userspace reads and writes
to PKRU. Because PKRU values are part of a processor core’s extended register state, PKRU
can also be written by the xrstor instruction, which is designed to restore register state after
context switches. A number of recent PKU-based memory isolation frameworks have been
proposed [46, 72, 38]. Here we focus on the most performant systems, i.e. those that do
not require additional mechanisms to protect against code reuse attacks. In general, these
systems require hardening the PKU feature by gatekeeping PKRU state.

2.2.2

ERIM

ERIM’s security hinges on the absence of unsafe wrpkru instructions in executable pages of
MU (T is trusted not to call back into U or contain exploitable control flow vulnerabilities).
Safe wrpkru instances are those immediately followed by either 1) a jump into T , or 2) a check
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Figure 2.1: ERIM Architecture [72] with seccomp filters and process tracing.
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Figure 2.2: ERIM architecture [72] using a kernel module.
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that MT is locked by the PKRU register. Failing this check triggers process termination.
An attacker who compromises U could exploit unsafe wrpkru instructions to unlock MT
from U ; without such instructions, MT is secure even without control flow integrity (CFI)
in U . The call gates contain only safe wrpkrus by construction, but preventing intentional
or unintentional occurrences of executable wrpkru instructions in MU requires both syscall
interception and binary inspection. Similar techniques are used to protect against unsafe
xrstor instructions.
The purpose of binary inspection in ERIM is to scan memory for instructions that
could be exploited to unlock MT from U . When an ERIM-secured application is started,
ERIM scans MU for unsafe wrpkru/xrstor instructions. If any are detected, ERIM can
be either replace them with safe variants (e.g., by adding a check that MT remains locked)
or immediately terminate the secured application. This initial inspection ensures no unsafe
instructions are present in MU at startup, but is insufficient on its own to prevent occurrences
throughout the process’ runtime - an attacker could map a new virtual memory page after the
initial scan to introduce and execute unsafe instructions. ERIM intercepts related syscalls
in an attempt to block this attack vector.
Interception can be performed via small kernel modifications (e.g. a Linux Security
Module [62]), or by installing seccomp filters [4] that inform a tracer process. The seccomp
filter with tracer mode is shown in Figure 2.1, while the kernel mode of operation is depicted
in Figure 2.2. Figures 2.1 and 2.2 highlight how ERIM is deployed in practice, integrating
with the host operating system and secured application binary.
In either case, mmap (mapping new pages), mprotect (page permission changes), and
pkey mprotect (page PKU region registration) syscalls from U that map executable memory
pages are intercepted and redirected to ERIM functions in T . The memory is mapped only
after the requested page sequence is scanned for wrpkru instructions within or across pages.
Alternatively, ERIM can delay the scan and mark the sequence as “pending executable” for
on-demand processing. Attempts to execute instructions from one of these pages will cause
a fault handled by ERIM that signals a scan for that page alone. Scan failure results in
termination of the program.
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2.2.3

Hodor

As in ERIM, Hodor [38] separates trusted components T from untrusted components U ,
but different mechanisms are employed to create trust boundaries and prevent exploitation.
More than two trust levels are supported; here we use T and U to simplify the description.
In this section, we describe only the PKU-based variant (Hodor-PKU), but a more complete
discussion in available in Section 2.1.

Hodor always defines elements in T via library

boundaries. A trusted loader ensures that the only entry points into T libraries exposed
to U are gated by trampolines (analogues to ERIM call gates) that manage PKRU state.
Like ERIM, Hodor deploys interception and inspection techniques to guard the PKRU before
and during runtime.
The trusted loader is tasked with scanning for unsafe instructions that occur outside
trampolines. Inspection is performed at startup, and again when any sequence of pages is
marked executable by the protected application. Any pages containing unsafe instructions
are marked pending executable. Calling into these marked pages will trigger a page fault,
signaling the Hodor-modified kernel to load the address of unsafe instructions in debug
registers. With this monitoring system in place, any attempt to execute unsafe instructions
will be vetted by the kernel, and the page is marked executable. If the debug registers
were previously watching another page, that page is returned to pending executable status.
This mechanism prevents unsafe PKRU-writing instructions without the need for binary
rewriting.
At startup, the trusted loader registers the virtual address space of each library in T at
runtime, and subsequent calls to mmap, mprotect, or pkey mprotect are checked against the
current PKRU value by the modified kernel. This interception guarantees that component
memory accesses are consistent with their assigned trust levels.
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Chapter 3
Attacks on PKU-based Isolation
After examining the kernel security model for PKU and the available attack surface in the
sandboxes, we identified several potential vectors for circumventing the protections intended
by intra-process isolation. We then developed ten concrete proofs-of-concept, listed in Table
3.1. The following sections develop a rough taxonomy of the attacks and present their
technical details.

3.1

Methodology

3.1.1

Threat Model

We use the same threat model described in current research on secure isolation with PKU.
We assume the attacker can execute arbitrary machine code in the untrusted domain,
with the exception that executed code cannot initially contain unsafe wrpkru and xrstor
instructions. We assume trusted component’s interface is free of exploitable vulnerabilities.
This is consistent with the threat model shared by both ERIM and Hodor.
We assume the initial state of the application is not compromised. The kernel, linker, or
application is trusted to correctly initialize the PKU sandbox. Trusted components loaded
from disk are assumed to be trustworthy (e.g., protected by file permissions).
0

Portions of this chapter appeared in Usenix Security 2020.
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Table 3.1: Summary of developed proof-of-concepts.

Attack Name

Key Syscalls

VM Read
Procfs Write
File Mapping
Shared Memory
Remap
Sigreturn
Map Race
Scan Race
Pkey
Seccomp

process vm readv
open, seek, write
open, mmap, write
shm open, mmap
mmap, mprotect, mremap
rt sigreturn
clone, mmap
clone, mmap
pkey mprotect
prctl
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However, after the sandbox initialization, we make no further assumptions about the code
running in the untrusted component. In particular, the untrusted component may contain
memory corruption vulnerabilities that allow an attacker to carry out a control flow hijacking
attack and cause arbitrary behavior. While other mitigations aim to prevent control flow
hijacking [75, 70, 61, 80], they also carry a significant performance penalty and may not be
completely effective [22, 78, 76, 33]. Both ERIM and Hodor are designed to provide secure
isolation without additional protection from control flow hijacking.
We assume no vulnerabilities in a trusted library, the kernel, or hardware. The kernel is
assumed to be trusted and free of vulnerabilities. Similarly, we do not consider attacks that
exploit flaws in hardware such as transient execution attacks [45, 19, 51].

3.1.2

Approach to Sandbox and Kernel Analysis

Because our threat model intends to protect against an attacker running arbitrary code,
the attack surface consists of all system calls that are both unprivileged and that are not
already restricted by the existing PKU-based sandboxes. We exclude privileged system calls
because current intra-process isolation systems do not address the question of running with
elevated system-wide privileges (i.e., as the root user) and do not appear to be designed for
this scenario.
We examined kernel documentation, code, and communications on developer mailing
lists. We manually reviewed each system call available on the x86-64 architecture in Linux
4.9 for any system calls that could affect a process’s own virtual address space, memory
contents, or other intra-process resources. After identifying these system calls, we consulted
code and documentation to determine if they were able to undermine the security of the
PKU-based sandbox. Publicly-available archived kernel developer mailing lists also offered
insight into the intents of kernel maintainers, which allowed us to identify the difference
between sandbox and kernel developers’ views of PKU.
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3.1.3

Attack Evaluation and Proofs-of-Concept

Based on the designs of the proposed PKU-based sandbox, we develop several distinct
software attacks that allow an untrusted component to access protected memory.

We

evaluate our proposed attacks against the publicly-released source code of the ERIM
project [71]. We tested our exploits against ERIM’s ptrace-based sandbox, which runs
in userspace and does not require kernel modifications. We wrote a library that allocates
protected memory and stores a secret using ERIM’s API. In all cases, the attacker’s goal is
to disclose protected memory. We consider an exploit successful when code in the untrusted
component is able to access memory that is isolated to the trusted component without
entering the trusted context through a legitimate call gate.
We made small changes to ERIM’s code to get a more complete working prototype.
Specifically, we implemented the on-demand executable page inspection described in Section
3.4 of ERIM’s design and extended the ptrace-based sandbox to provide minimal support
for multi-threaded processes as described in Section 3.7 of ERIM [72]. For each change, we
attempted to keep the implementation as closely aligned with the design as possible. We
did not introduce additional weaknesses, but we also did not add new protections against
attacks not considered in the design.
We tested ERIM on an AWS EC2 c5.large virtual machine instance provisioned for this
research, which provides two cores of an Intel Xeon Platinum 8124M processor. The virtual
machine ran the Debian 8 operating system with Linux kernel version 4.9.168. At the time
of testing, this is the latest build of the same major/minor kernel version used in ERIM [72].

3.2
3.2.1

Attack Details
Subverting Memory Permissions

Both ERIM and Hodor rely on basic assumptions about the enforcement of memory page
permissions. ERIM assumes that pages cannot be mapped with both executable and writable
permissions at the same time, an abstraction sometimes referred to as “WˆX” (Write
exclusive-or eXecute). Since Linux by default allows pages to be simultaneously writable
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and executable, ERIM also introduces a “trusted-only execute memory” (TEM) module to
intercept mmap and mprotect calls and enforce WˆX. When the application requests a new
executable page, the TEM module takes one of two possible actions. If the call originates
from the trusted domain, then the request is allowed unchanged. Otherwise, the TEM
module removes the executable permission before forwarding the request to the kernel, but
the TEM module internally records that page as pending executable. When the process
attempts to execute that page, the kernel delivers a segfault signal to the process. The TEM
module handles the signal, checking if it originates from an attempt to execute a page that
was requested with execute permissions earlier. If so, the TEM module scans the page for
wrpkru or xrstor instructions. Upon determination that the page is safe, then the TEM
module instructs the kernel to mark the page as executable but not writable. The TEM
module is intended to preserve two critical properties: 1) The untrusted domain cannot
mark unsafe pages executable, and 2) The untrusted domain cannot give a page writable
and executable permissions at the same time.
Hodor takes a similar approach, introducing kernel patches that add new checks to some
memory-related syscalls and inspect executable code for wrpkru and xrstor instructions.
Hodor also currently prevents executable code from being mapped writable, although the
authors describe a possible extension that allows code pages to be safely modified and
inspected using a mechanism analogous to ERIM’s segfault handler.
It is critical that the untrusted domain does not have access to a page that is both writable
and executable. If the untrusted domain were able to write directly to executable memory,
then it could simply write an unsafe wrpkru gadget and execute it. While in theory it would
be possible to intercept and check every memory write using dynamic instrumentation, this
approach would have an unacceptable performance impact. Instead, ERIM and Hodor use
page table permissions as the hardware-supported mechanisms to prevent a process from
writing and executing memory.
Unfortunately, both systems incorrectly assume that marking a memory mapping as nonwritable makes the memory actually immutable. Surprisingly, in modern Linux kernels, the
fact that a memory page is mapped without writable permissions does not guarantee that
the memory is immutable. We developed several proof-of-concept attacks that exploit this
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faulty assumption to execute arbitrary unsafe code and gain control over the PKRU register
from an untrusted domain. Similarly, we found multiple interfaces that Linux, by design,
provides for accessing process memory that ignore PKU domains on a page.
Linux provides several interfaces that allow processes to access their own memory
indirectly, through the kernel.

In many cases these interfaces bypass checks for page

read/write/execute (rwx) permissions, PKU permissions, or both.

Any interface that

bypasses page write permissions can modify the code of the process at run time to add
an unsafe wrpkru instruction that unlocks all PKU domains.

Inconsistent Enforcement of PKU Permissions
The process vm readv and process vm writev syscalls both provide a kernel interface
through which a process can read and write the memory of a target thread. These calls
require no privileges (and in fact bypass LSM checks) when the target thread is in the same
thread group (process) as the calling thread. Additionally, neither proposed PKU-based
sandbox traces or restricts these calls. Therefore, a process is always allowed to access its own
memory via these syscalls. Documentation for process vm readv and process vm writev
states that they will fail if they attempt to access memory “inaccessible to the local
process,” [3] but this documentation is ambiguous in the context of PKU permissions—
is memory blocked by the current state of the PKRU register considered “inaccessible?” In
testing, we found that these calls do respect traditional page permissions, but ignore PKU
domains. An untrusted application can therefore use these syscalls to access memory that
would otherwise be protected by the PKU system.
While this issue is an oversight in existing implementation, it is not difficult to fix. The
sandbox can inspect calls to these syscalls and deny access to PKU-protected pages from
untrusted application components. Since these calls seem to be never or rarely used in
common applications this would have negligible performance impact. No references to these
calls appear at all in the source code of the applications benchmarked in ERIM.
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Inconsistent Enforcement of Page Table Permissions
In addition to kernel interfaces that merely ignore PKU protections, there are also interfaces
that deliberately allow processes to read and write memory regardless of page table
permissions or PKU tags. The ptrace syscall allows reading and modifying memory without
being subject to page permissions or PKU permissions, and a thread is always allowed to
attach to another thread in the same thread group. In this way, an untrusted application can
modify executable code even in a non-writable page to add unsafe wrpkru instructions, or
simply read the PKU-protected memory directly, regardless of the current state of the PKRU
register. This attack may not be possible against ERIM’s ptrace-based sandbox because an
application cannot be traced twice, but it would be possible against kernel-based sandboxes
such as Hodor or ERIM’s kernel TEM module. This attack could also be prevented just by
limiting calls to ptrace, again with negligible performance impact for applications that do
not frequently call ptrace.
The most problematic alternative interface is in the mem pseudo-file provided by procfs.
This file supports standard IO operations via the usual syscalls (open, seek, read, write),
but treats the file stream position as an address in the process’s virtual address space. A
process can open its mem file at the path “/proc/self/mem”, seek to an arbitrary offset,
and perform reads or writes at that address. Reads and writes made through this interface,
by design, ignore permissions on page mappings. An untrusted application can either read
protected memory directly from this interface, or modify unwritable code in order to control
the PKRU register.
This interface is more difficult to restrict without either making changes to the kernel
or significantly impacting performance, since using the ptrace-based sandbox would, at
a minumum, require tracing every open-like syscall. Unlike the mmap-like calls that are
currently tracked by the ptrace-based sandbox, open-like calls are very common in typical
applications, as supported by our performance analysis in Section 3.4.

Removing the

“/proc/self/mem” file would require kernel changes and might break compatibility with
programs that use this file for legitimate purposes.
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Mappings with Mutable Backings. Another problem arises when processes can map
memory into their virtual address space that is backed by something mutable even though
the mapping may be marked non-writable. Recall that page permissions (and PKU tags)
are associated with the virtual memory mappings, not with the object that the mapping
refers to. In this case, it is possible for an attacker to create an executable, non-writable
mapping to memory that contains no unsafe wrpkru instructions initially, but is backed by
a mutable object. The non-writable permission prevents modifications made to the memory
through that mapping, but it does not prevent the underlying object from being changed.
This allows the attacker to modify the underlying object to add an unsafe wrpkru (and
execute it) without detection by the sandbox. Figure 3.1 illustrates two examples of this
class of attack.
The simplest example is a memory-mapped file. The mmap syscall allows the caller to
specify a file descriptor, which will then expose a given portion of a file as memory in the
caller’s virtual address space. Even if the mapping is made without write permissions, the
file system permissions of the backing file may be writable. Any changes made to that file
are then reflected in the process’s view of that memory as well. So, an attacker running code
in the untrusted domain can create a file with rwx file system permissions in any writable
location (e.g. /tmp) and write some innocuous code to the file. The attacker will then map
the file in virtual memory with r-x permissions using mmap, but write an unsafe wrpkru
gadget to the file using the write syscall. Finally, the attacker can execute the wrpkru
gadget to unlock all PKU domains.
A similar attack is possible without touching the file system by using a shared memory
mapping. In Linux, processes can create or obtain a reference to a shared memory object
with the shm open syscall. The shared memory can then be mapped into the process virtual
address space via the standard mmap. There is no requirement that page permissions be
consistent across multiple mappings of the same shared memory, either across or within
processes. For example, it is possible for a process to map the same shared memory page
into its virtual address space twice: once with r-x permissions and once with rw- permissions.
Any changes made by writing rw- page are reflected in the r-x, since both mappings refer to
the same physical memory. Even if the sandbox were able to prevent a process from mapping
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Figure 3.1: Two examples where WˆX does not guarantee code immutability in Linux.
Permissions applied to virtual memory mappings do not necessarily apply to the underlying
physical memory or file that backs the mapping.
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the same memory twice with different permissions, the same attack is possible as long as the
attacker can fork a separate process and map the shared memory once into each process. To
fully prevent this attack, significant restrictions would have to be placed on shared memory
in general (such as disallowing executable mapping of all shared memory). Alternatively, a
kernel-wide state could be kept in order to prevent the same memory from being mapped
twice in any process with incompatible write and execute permissions.

3.2.2

Changing Code by Relocation

The previous attacks all read or write memory that was assumed inaccessible due to pagelevel permissions. When memory that is not expected to be writable can be modified, an
attacker can introduce dangerous wrpkru gadgets to executable memory. However, it’s also
possible for an attacker to introduce wrpkru instructions just by changing the locations
of memory mappings, without changing their content.

The mremap system call allows

the attacker to move pages to different locations in the address space, but current PKUbased sandboxes do not intercept this syscall. Because x86-64 instructions are not aligned,
just rearranging pages can create instructions that did not exist before, including wrpkru
instructions.
Concretely, an attacker can exploit this by creating two memory mappings at distant
addresses that each contain part of a wrpkru instruction at the page boundary: the first
half of the instruction bytes at the end of one page, and the ending half of the instruction
bytes at the beginning of the other page. At the time the pages are mapped in, the sandbox
vets each mapping for unsafe wrpkru instructions. Because neither page contains a complete
instruction, both mappings are allowed. The attacker then calls mremap to move the pages
into an adjacent position in the virtual address space. Since the sandbox does not monitor
or restrict mremap calls, the attacker successfully creates a new wrpkru gadget without
interception by the sandbox. Figure 3.2 visualizes this attack.
This attack shows that it is not sufficient for a sandbox to inspect calls that create new
memory mappings or modify mapping permissions; the sandbox must inspect any call that
might modify the arrangement of mapped pages as well. Whenever the virtual address space
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Figure 3.2: The mremap attack. Two pages of code are initially mapped into the process. At
this point, the bytes for the wrpkru instruction out of order, so the mappings are allowed by
the sandbox. A call to mremap modifies the page layout to introduce a new wrpkru gadget,
but does not trigger a new scan.
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of the process changes, the sandbox must re-scan the boundaries of any affected executable
pages to maintain its security invariants.

3.2.3

Controlling PKRU from the Kernel

Both ERIM and Hodor focus on ensuring that there are no useful wrpkru or xrstor gadgets
available to an attacker in the untrusted application, but the kernel can also modify the state
of the PKRU register. Therefore, PKU-based sandboxes must also consider kernel interfaces
that may allow a process to control the PKRU value indirectly.
The sigreturn syscall provides a concrete example of a kernel interface through which
an attacker can modify the PKRU register. Previous work by Bosman and Bos [18] showed
that a single sigreturn gadget is enough for an attacker to execute Turing-complete code or
to make arbitrary syscalls without introducing new machine code, and that such gadgets are
widespread in real-world systems. We find that a sigreturn gadget also allows the attacker
to control the PKRU register without needing a wrpkru or xrstor instruction.
A process ordinarily uses sigreturn to restore the program’s execution state after
handling a signal. When the kernel delivers a signal to the process, it first stores the
process’s execution state on the stack of the signal handler. It then pushes a return pointer
to a sigreturn trampoline and starts execution at the signal handler. When the handler
returns, it pops the return pointer to the sigreturn trampoline. The trampoline then
makes the sigreturn syscall, with the previously-stored state still on the stack. Figure 3.3
illustrates the state of the userspace stack upon signal delivery.
Inside the kernel, sigreturn restores the process CPU state from the stored values on
the stack before returning to userspace. That state includes the contents of registers such as
the instruction pointer, stack pointer, and general-purpose registers. It can also contain an
extended set of registers including floating-point registers and the PKRU register.
Since existing PKU-based sandboxes only consider wrpkru and xrstor instructions,
they do not prevent the untrusted application from modifying its own PKRU register via
sigreturn. An attacker can set up a crafted state on the stack and make the sigreturn
syscall to convince the kernel to “restore” an arbitrary value to the PKRU register without
needing a wrpkru or xrstor gadget in userspace.
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Figure 3.3: State of userspace stack during signal delivery. The saved PKRU state is stored
among the CPU extended state in unprotected memory, and can be modified by the handler
or another thread before it is restored by the kernel.
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Note also that proposed patches [16] to the Linux kernel that mitigate the sigreturnoriented programming attacks described by Bosman and Bos [18] do not appear to prevent
this attack from working against PKU-based sandboxes because they are aimed at preventing
initial exploitation of sigreturn calls by an attacker to bootstrap a control-flow hijacking
attack. In contrast, the threat model for intra-process memory isolation assumes that an
attacker already controls execution in the untrusted component. The proposed patches make
blind exploitation of sigreturn gadgets more difficult by requiring a secret “signal cookie”
placed by the kernel at signal delivery to remain intact upon signal return. This mitigation
does not stop an attacker who already has the ability to register signal handlers or arrange
for the delivery of real signals.

3.2.4

Race Conditions

The architecture of PKU-based memory isolation sandboxes must also consider an attacker
who can attempt to exploit race conditions by controlling more than one thread. An attacker
who compromises the control flow of one thread can generally hijack other threads by
tampering with their stacks. Even in an application that is ordinarily single-threaded, an
attacker can call the clone syscall to create a new thread. Consequently, sandboxes must
either handle race conditions or explicitly forbid new threads by blocking calls to clone.
Existing designs do consider some potential race condition attacks. ERIM specifies that
the trusted library T should allocate a PKU-protected stack to prevent other threads from
accessing intermediate data or hijacking control flow while T is executing. Hodor also
requires that each trusted library has its own set of stacks that are accessible only from
that library. However, there are other attack vectors for race conditions that must also be
carefully considered.

Signal Delivery
Hodor additionally blocks delivery of signals while the trusted library is executing, in order
to prevent an attacker from interrupting the trusted library. Recall from Section 3.2.3 that
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signal delivery stores CPU state including general-purpose registers on the stack. This means
that if a signal is delivered while execution is in the trusted component T , the kernel may leak
the contents of T ’s registers to the untrusted application by placing them on an unprotected
stack. Note that this issue is distinct from the ability to control PKRU via sigreturn;
this information leakage would occur at the time of signal delivery, not the return from the
handler.
At first glance it may appear that this issue could also be easily fixed by using a PKUprotected stack for signal handling. In Linux, a process can use the syscall sigaltstack
to specify a memory region to be used as the stack for signal handling. However, when the
kernel delivers a signal it first writes the context data to the handler stack before transferring
control to the handler. The kernel checks the value of the PKRU register at the time of signal
delivery. If the write would not be allowed under that PKRU value, then the kernel refuses
to write the context data and instead delivers a segfault to the process. This design choice by
the Linux kernel developers makes it difficult to set up a protected stack for signal handling
that functions correctly regardless of when a signal is delivered.

Memory Scanning
Recall that both ERIM and Hodor scan new executable memory that is loaded by the
untrusted application to vet it for unsafe wrpkru gadgets. To do this securely, it is critical
that the order of operations is considered. For example, consider an application that makes
an mprotect call to change the permissions on one page from rw- to r-x. If the order of
these operations is not handled carefully, then it may leave the implementation vulnerable to
one of two race conditions. First, if the sandbox performs the scan making the permissions
change, then a second thread in the untrusted application can modify memory during the
scan but before the permissions change. This may result in code that was safe at the time
it was scanned, but is not safe by the time it is marked executable. If instead the sandbox
makes the permission change first and then does the scan, then another thread can attempt
execute the unvetted page before the scan completes.
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Several factors make this race condition practical to exploit. First, the attacker may
fork child processes to repeatedly attempt the race condition. Secondly, the attacker can
get feedback (via the output of the child process) on whether an attempt failed because the
change was made too early (before the bytes were scanned) or too late (after the page was
no longer writable). Some amount of CPU scheduling is also under the attackers control;
in a multi-core system, the attacker may bind each thread to separate cores to increase the
odds that they run concurrently. The combination of these factors allows an attacker to
repeatedly attempt the exploit, while dynamically adjusting the timing based on feedback
from each attempt.
In order to close off this avenue of attack, the sandbox must temporarily render the
page both non-writable and non-executable, perform the scan, and then mark the page
readable and executable. This ordering prevents both execution of the memory before the
scan and modification of the memory during the scan, assuming that attacks subverting page
permissions (detailed in Section 3.2.1) are also mitigated.

Determination of Trusted Mappings - ERIM
The paper describing ERIM does not detail exactly how the ptrace-based sandbox determines
whether a mapping is requested by the trusted library T or not. However, the published
implementation uses a bit stored in global (PKU-protected) memory to enable trusted
mappings. The bit is set just before performing a trusted mapping and cleared immediately
afterwards. When a memory-related call is made, the tracer reads this bit to determine if
the process is currently in a trusted context. Note that since the bit is stored in a PKUprotected page, the untrusted component cannot simply toggle this bit itself to perform a
trusted mapping; it must go through the trusted component.
However, since this flag is shared for the whole process, a race conditions results when
there are multiple threads mapping memory. If an untrusted context makes a mapping at the
same time that a trusted mapping is being made, then the both mappings will be accepted
as trusted.
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1

// Trusted Component

2
3
4
5
6

char * secret ;
void allocate_secret () {
// map a new secret page
secret = mmap ( NULL , PAGE_SIZE , read_write , ...) ;

7

// isolate the page to the component
int r = pkey_mprotect ( secret_page ,
PAGE_SIZE ,
read_write ,
TRUSTED_PKEY ) ;

8
9
10
11
12
13

// If pkey_mprotect fails , kill process
if ( r != 0) exit (1) ;

14
15
16

}

17
18
19

// Untrusted Component

20
21
22
23

void exploit () {
// override the pkey_mprotect syscall to skip but return 0
a d d _ s e c c o m p _ o v e r r i d e ( SYS_mprotect_key , 0) ;

24

// call trusted library - pkey_mprotect () silently fails
allocate_secret () ;

25
26
27

// secret is accessible to untrusted component
printf ( " secret : % s \ n " , secret ) ;

28
29
30

}

Listing 3.1: C-like pseudocode illustrating how seccomp filters can be used to manipulate
intra-process behavior.
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The attacker can create a second thread that attempts to create a mapping with rwx
permissions in a tight loop. On the main thread, the attacker induces a legitimate trusted
mapping call by mapping in new, safe executable code. After the subsequent scan completes,
ERIM’s trusted library makes a trusted mprotect call to mark the code as r-x. Meanwhile,
the second thread is repeatedly attempting to make rwx mappings. In an untrusted context,
these mappings are ordinarily downgraded to rw- by the tracer. However, when the call
is made simultaneously with the legitimate trusted mapping in the main thread, the tracer
checks the global variable and mistakenly identifies both as trusted. This allows the rwx
mapping to succeed. Once the mapping has been created, the attacker can write and execute
unsafe code on this page without detection by the sandbox. Figure 3.4 shows the execution
of both threads on the same timeline. The attacker repeatedly attempts to create rwx in a
very small loop, while another thread creates legitimate trusted r-x mappings. Afterwards
the attacker checks the permissions of the mapped page and uses any that are rwx. Because
the attacker can quickly and repeatedly attempt the race condition without any adverse
effects, exploiting this race condition is very practical.

3.2.5

Interfering with Non-memory Shared Resources

Besides attacking memory directly, an attacker may also target other process-wide shared
resources that may affect the behavior of the trusted library. Consequently, even trusted
libraries with apparently bug-free code may have vulnerabilities when they rely on
assumptions about resources that may be open to tampering from the untrusted components.
Influencing Intra-process Behavior with seccomp
One example of a potentially exploitable shared resource is the seccomp filter associated with
the process. Processes can specify a seccomp filter via the prctl syscall. The filter runs each
time the process attempts to make a syscall, and may either allow the syscall to execute or
cause it to return immediately with a specified value. ERIM’s ptrace-based sandbox uses
a seccomp filter to intercept memory-related syscalls, but this does not stop the untrusted
component from further installing new filters. When multiple filters are installed, all are run
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Figure 3.4: In ERIM, a race condition allows an untrusted thread to make writable and
executable mappings, as long as they are made concurrently to a trusted component mapping
in another thread.
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but certain return results take precedent over others (in general, the more restrictive result
takes precedence) [4].
A malicious seccomp filter can alter the behavior or return values of a syscall in a way that
violates the ordinary behavior of the syscall, creating an exploitable condition in otherwise
correct code. Linux does not allow a process with a seccomp filter to execute an SUID
application in order to prevent it from undermining the behavior of the application run with
elevated privileges [4]. The same risk applies when switching to a trusted component in a
PKU-based secure memory isolation system.
More concretely, imagine a trusted library that allocates new memory and then tries
to protect the memory with its PKU domain by calling pkey mprotect on it. The library
trusts the kernel to execute the call and update the PKU domain on the mapped memory, or
return an error value. However, a malicious seccomp filter could deny pkey mprotect calls
and force them to return a value indicating success. This attack would allow an attacker
to trick the trusted library into using unprotected memory that it believes to be isolated.
Listing 3.2.4 demonstrates this attack in C-like pseudocode.
Modifying Trusted Mappings
An attacker may also try to access isolated memory or modify the trusted library code by
changing the virtual address space of the trusted library. Hodor discusses such attacks and
prevents them by informing the kernel of the trusted libraries code and data addresses, then
preventing further attempts to change those mappings from an untrusted context. However,
ERIM does not consider such attacks.
For example, instead of trying to change the PKRU register to grant access to a particular
PKU domain, the attacker may simply change the PKU domain associated with the mapping
to make it accessible.

The attacker can make a pkey mprotect syscall, changing the

protection key on any page to the untrusted domain. The kernel allows this call regardless
of the PKRU register state of the caller or the PKU domain of the targeted memory; there
is no requirement that the caller is able to actually read or write the targeted memory at the
time the call is made. Because trusted component has permission to access both the trusted
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and untrusted domains, subsequent accesses from the trusted component succeed as usual,
and the trusted component is unaware of the change in the page’s protection key.
Similar attacks are possible by targeting the code mappings of a trusted library. If the
code that immediately follows a trusted context switch can be swapped out using syscalls like
munmap, mmap, or mremap then the integrity of the trusted library code may be compromised.

3.3

Discussion

The diverse set of vulnerabilities in existing PKU-based sandboxes require diverse mitigations. Attacks that take advantage of alternate memory access paths (detailed in Section
3.2.1) require a comprehensive solution to guarantee the integrity of executable code in a
process’s virtual address space, which we discuss later in Section ??. Race conditions can
be mitigated by a design that incorporates a multi-threaded attacker into the threat model
and orders operations carefully, preventing intervening changes, which we also discuss later
in Section 5. Other attacks, such as the mremap and seccomp exploits described in Sections
3.2.2 and 3.2.5 can be mitigated by more carefully restricting certain syscalls. However,
tracing additional syscalls in the ptrace-based sandbox has a high overhead for syscalls that
are called often, which we measure in this section. Still others attacks, like the sigreturn
attack in Section 3.2.3, could be easily mitigated by kernel changes but do not appear to be
completely fixable using only the ptrace-based sandbox architecture.
Intra-process isolation fundamentally changes the threat model of an operating system
that otherwise gives processes a high degree of control over their own code and environment.
As a result, intra-process isolation systems risk turning otherwise innocuous kernel interfaces
into vulnerabilities. PKU-based memory isolation systems are especially fragile because
the Linux kernel does not treat PKU as a security feature (in fact, a recent patch to
the Linux kernel introduced an internal kernel helper function for bypassing PKU-related
checks on userspace memory accesses [37], which is used to service some syscalls such as
process vm read). In this situation, it is difficult for system designers to conclusively identify
every kernel interface that may violate the new security assumptions imposed on it.
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3.3.1

PKU: Reliability or Security?

PKU is not designed as a security feature, since an unprivileged instruction can assign
arbitrary rights to the PKRU register. Of course, this design does not mean that PKU
cannot be repurposed for security. But it does have important implications for the way
kernel developers perceive and treat the feature. For example, an early discussion on a
Linux developer mailing list (which decided how sigreturn should treat the PKRU register)
envisioned PKU being used to provide reliability against accidental out-of-bounds memory
accesses, rather than security against an intentional attacker [55]. Developers likely used
similar reasoning when deciding to allow processes from indirectly accessing their own PKUprotected memory through interfaces like process vm readv, ptrace, and /proc/self/mem.
ERIM and Hodor must assume a trusted, secure kernel. Otherwise, whatever security
guarantees they provide in userspace are moot. However, the above issues show that it is
not enough for the kernel to be trustworthy in its own threat model, but that it must also
enforce the new trust boundaries required by the PKU sandbox. The PKU-based sandboxes
try to augment the kernel to this end, but it is very difficult for the sandbox designers
to retroactively find and undo the large number of security-relevant decisions that kernel
developers made when supporting the PKU feature without the expectation that it would
be used for security.

3.3.2

Assumptions in Secure System Design

The PKU-based sandboxes that we examine in this paper both suffer from similar
vulnerabilities because they make some of the same incorrect assumptions, particularly
assumptions around the kernel’s management of the PKU feature and virtual memory. They
assume that, by preventing writable executable memory mappings, WˆX fully protects a
process’s code. This abstraction of WˆX in Linux is also used in other systems security
papers that rely on code integrity [32]. However, as our work demonstrates, the Linux
virtual memory system requires non-trivial changes to achieve robust code integrity.
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3.3.3

Towards Mitigation

Virtual Address Space Integrity. The first challenge to completely addressing the
vulnerabilities presented earlier is to mitigate attacks that undermine the virtual address
space integrity of the process. Although Linux supports basic page permissions, it is not
designed to support strong guarantees about the integrity of code (even in non-writable
mappings), as evidenced by the several interfaces that intentionally circumvent page mapping
permissions (detailed in Section 3.2.1). To close these loopholes, userspace applications need
a way both to disallow further changes to non-writable pages from interfaces like ptrace and
procfs and to prevent mappings that cannot guarantee integrity (i.e., shared memory or
file-backed mappings where changes to the underlying resource may be seen in the mapped
memory). In Chapter 5 we investigate wider implications of these findings and propose
systemic solutions. In Section 3.4 we rule out the obvious solution of simply extending the
ptrace-based sandbox by showing that it leads to unacceptable performance degradation.
The interfaces that ignore page permissions like ptrace and procfs are relatively
straightforward to mitigate. Since the kernel currently intentionally allows access for these
interfaces, patches could be introduced to deny access instead. Both of these interfaces are
mediated by “ptrace access checks,” which presently are universally allowed for same-PID
accesses [6]. The kernel could simply add a new interface for userspace processes to request
that further ptrace access checks are denied even for the same PID.
Race Conditions Associated with Seccomp-based Filtering. In addition to challenges
securing the virtual address space, another serious problem for the ptrace-based sandbox
architecture presented earlier in Section 3.4 is a race condition inherent in certain types of
filtering with seccomp and ptrace. The seccomp filter language provides support for numeric
filtering of syscall arguments in-kernel, but any further inspection (e.g., dereferencing pointer
arguments) is possible only from the tracer running in userspace via the ptrace interface
[4]. However, if the tracer does dereference a pointer and allow the syscall to proceed, then
the memory is accessed twice: once from the tracer, and once from the kernel when the
syscall is actually executed. Therefore, the tracer has no guarantee that the value inspected
is unmodified by the time it is used.
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This potential race condition makes it difficult for a ptrace-based sandbox to safely
inspect arguments to syscalls that require the kernel to read from userspace memory, such
as open (which accepts a pointer to the path string) and sigreturn (which reads a saved
context structure from the processes’s stack pointer). In both cases, the tracer may inspect
the memory of the process, but if it finds safe values and allows the syscall to proceed then
it has no guarantee that the memory is unchanged when the kernel accesses it.

3.4

Performance Impact of Extended Ptrace-based
Sandboxing

We develop an extension to the ptrace-based sandbox that prevents a subset of the attacks
developed earlier. Notably, we can partially mitigate the exploits from Section 3.2 by tracing
added system calls in ERIM [72]. These system calls are shown in Table 3.2, along with what
threat vectors they mitigate. We add additional seccomp BPF filters to the ptrace-based
sandbox module of ERIM, which routes calls to ERIM that need to be checked for memory
access permissions. ERIM’s ptrace-based sandbox runs only in userspace and does not
require kernel changes. The ptrace-based sandbox instruments programs by calling them
with a binary provided in the ERIM software package. This sandbox model is the more likely
target for practical deployment of ERIM to protect real users against software vulnerabilities.
We re-iterate that these additional traces do not constitute complete mitigations to the
attacks described in Section 3.2 against PKU systems in general, but serve to demonstrate a
lower bound on overhead to the proposed ERIM system when adding the necessary additional
syscall traces to ERIM. We emphasize that these results apply only to the ptrace-based
sandbox architecture, where performance is heavily dependent on the number of system
calls requiring a context switch to the tracing process. Kernel-based solutions (for example,
using Linux security module) avoid this performance problem but incur deployability and
maintainability costs.
The authors of ERIM [72] measured the throughput of the popular NGINX webserver in
requests per second using a server implementing OpenSSL with and without ERIM protecting
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secure key access. This benchmark serves to illustrate the performance impact of a webserver
protected by ERIM against software vulnerabilities versus a server that is not protected. The
authors claim that ERIM achieves roughly 95% to 98% of the performance of the native, nonprotected OpenSSL using the kernel module implementation of ERIM. We first replicate the
2% performance impact in requests per second shown by the ERIM Kernel bars in Figure 3.5.
We use the identical configuration to the published ERIM 1 , on an PKU-enabled Amazon
Web Services c5d.4xlarge EC2 instance, which has a 16-core Intel(R) Xeon(R) Platinum
8124M CPU @ 3.00GHz processor, 32 GB of RAM, and a 450 GB NVMe SSD. We run the
benchmarks with a 1-worker NGINX, 5 iterations, and 120 seconds of measurement time per
benchmark. We increased the iterations used to average the requests per second from 3 to
5 and increased the time from 65 to 120 seconds because these options from the published
configuration yielded larger standard deviations. With these parameters, all following results
had standard deviation percentages of less than 1.0.
To measure ERIM with the additional traced syscalls, we first need to examine the
performance of ERIM in kernel mode versus using the ptrace-based sandbox module. The
authors of ERIM claim that ERIM with ptrace has the same performance of the kernel
mode ERIM with only 2% overhead. We measure the difference and show the comparison
in Figure 3.5. Notably, we find the ptrace-based sandbox version incurs a significant
performance impact at lower content sizes compared to ERIM running in the kernel. At
1kb of content fetched by the Apache Benchmark suite, ERIM in userspace suffers 20% worse
performance than the published kernel mode ERIM benchmarks, and slowly approaches the
native and kernel version as more content is fetched.
We then altered ERIM to filter the additional system calls shown in Table 3.2 and
measured the performance. We find that modifying ERIM’s ptrace-based sandbox to trace
the syscalls responsible for the vulnerabilities in Section 3.2 results in a 40% greater loss in
throughput on top of the published version from August 2019. In raw performance
numbers, this loss in throughput translates to NGINX operating at 76,545 requests per
second for native performance at 1kb of content, 74,413 requests per second for the original
ERIM performance at 1kb of content, and 29,728 requests per second when ERIM has the
1

https://gitlab.mpi-sws.org/vahldiek/erim/tree/master/bench/webserver
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Table 3.2: Additional syscalls traced by our modified ERIM in order to demonstrate the
performance impact of only one portion of the patches needed to secure memory isolation
with PKU instructions.
Additional Traced Syscall

Comment

Mitigates Attack

open
creat
openat
munmap
mremap
remap file pages
prctl
ptrace
process vm readv
process vm writev
sigaltstack
rt sigreturn

Opening files or file-like objects
Functions like open
Functions like open()
Additional mmap-like call
Additional mmap-like call
Moves file-backed pages
Modifies process properties
Traces processes
Reads memory from other processes
Writes memory from other processes
Signal handling
Processes signals

Procfs Write/File Mapping/Shared Memory
Procfs Write/File Mapping/Shared Memory
Procfs Write/File Mapping/Shared Memory
Modifying trusted mappings
Remap
Remap
Seccomp
Indirect memory access
VM Read
VM Read
Prevents changing signal handler
Sigreturn

Figure 3.5: NGINX Throughput (requests/second) with one worker, normalized to native
(no protection), ERIM kernel mode vs. ERIM with ptrace.
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additional traces applied to mitigate the attacks in Section 3.2. ERIM-based web servers
including the additional traces identified in Table 3.2 operate at only 40% of the throughput
of the unsecured non-ERIM webserver performance, a stark difference from the 2% claimed
by Vahldiek et al. [72].
Figure 3.6 also highlights a version of ERIM where the additional traces are restricted
to only the open syscall. By examining the performance impact of only the open call, we
reveal that ERIM’s tracing of open alone leads to much of the loss in performance seen for
all syscalls traced in Table 3.2. The performance overhead of tracing open serves as a lower
bound to mitigate the Procfs Write, File Mapping, and Shared Memory vulnerabilities from
Section 3.2 and shown in Table 3.2.
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Figure 3.6: NGINX Throughput (requests/second) with one worker, normalized to native
(no protection) of the original ERIM, ERIM with the open() call traced, and ERIM with all
syscalls from Table 3.2 traced, with varying request sizes. Std. deviations all under 2.0%.
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Chapter 4
Generalizing Attacks on Weak
Memory Permission Model
In Section 3.2 we described several attacks against PKU-based intra-process isolation systems
that subvert assumptions about WˆX. Since this assumption is ubiquitous in systems security
literature, a natural question is whether any of these attacks apply to other in-process
protections like control-flow integrity (CFI). It is not immediately obvious that such a
generalization is possible. PKU-based sandboxes are unique in that they allow the attacker
nearly unrestricted access to execute machine code and system calls. In contrast, CFI intends
to prevent control-flow hijacking in the first place. Still, we find that the proc/mem attack is
highly general and can be exploited to break WˆX assumptions in fully-precise control-flow
integrity systems with shadow stacks under realistic assumptions.
We show that, because of gaps in memory permission enforcement in Linux, data-only
attacks can sometimes be extended to overwrite application code in-memory. These attacks
are feasible even in the presence of strong protections such as WˆX, fine-grained static
control-flow integrity (CFI) enforcement, and shadow stacks. We demonstrate the attack
using a simulated memory corruption model applied to the widely-used nginx HTTP server
[10]. This does not indicate the presence of an actual vulnerability in nginx; instead, we
modified a local copy of the nginx code to intentionally introduce a vulnerability in order to
simulate a memory corruption bug.
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Data-only attacks are known to be a realistic threat with potentially serious consequences,
but they are generally limited compared to control-flow hijacking attacks. By targeting
specific data, a variety of outcomes can be accomplished:
• Overwriting security-sensitive values such as an is admin flag can elevate an attacker’s
privileges within the scope of the application;
• Modifying file paths may allow the attacker to read or write local files;
• Controlling sensitive parameters to system calls like execve can allow the attacker to
execute new programs.
An attacker may find that one of these outcomes is enough to achieve their ends. However,
attackers may also be interested in objectives that are outside the immediate scope of the
vulnerable application. They may want to gain persistent access to the exploited host, use
the host to pivot into a private network, to gather data such as by sniffing network traffic on
the host, to escalate privileges by exploiting additional vulnerabilities, and so on. Arbitrary
machine code is the best possible outcome for an attacker because it grants them full access
to perform any action with the application’s privileges. It also serves as an ideal staging
point to launch further attacks, such as exploiting a kernel or hardware bug for privilege
escalation or pivoting through other hosts or networks.
Our contribution is to show how data-only attacks can combine with gaps in WˆX
protection in Linux to allow execution of arbitrary machine code. Previous techniques
for executing code from data-only attacks required that the attacker control arguments to
especially sensitive functions such as system or execve, or that the attacker could both write
to the file system and force the loading of code from the same file. Unlike those techniques,
ours requires only a file “offset-write” data-oriented gadget (a reachable code path that
writes to an attacker controlled offset of an arbitrary file). Our method also does not rely
on executing code through an interpreter (such as the shell), or writing or loading any code
from disk. Instead it modifies machine instructions in-memory, making it more difficult to
detect than attacks that modify write to long-term storage.
Crucially, we also demonstrate using data-only attacks to target and manipulate highlevel application behavior rather than working at the individual function or instruction level.
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By reasoning about the abstractions provided by the application and used in the code, we
can reconfigure the application at runtime using data-only attacks. We use this technique
to place the application in a state that is favorable to carrying out the proc/mem attack,
regardless of its initial configuration.
The proc/mem attack allows arbitrary code execution in cases where it was not previously
known to be possible. One would intuitively expect that controlled file write gadgets would
be more common that e.g. execve() gadgets. Indeed, at least one previous case studies of
vulnerable applications found that none of the 6 applications contained reachable execve()
gadgets, while 3 allowed arbitrary file writes with CFI and shadow stacks. Of these 3, only
2 of these applications had functionality to load the attacker-written code from disk. The
third, nginx, allowed arbitrary file writes but could not load the written code from disk.
Morton et al [63] showed that data-oriented attacks against nginx are a serious realistic
threat, demonstrating the ability to reconfigure the server to downgrade SSL versions, leak
arbitrary files from the server, enable/disable access control, and more. Using a similar
model, we additionally demonstrate that truly arbitrary code execution is also possible using
the proc/mem attack.

4.1

Threat Model

Our threat model assumes that the attacker can repeatedly read and write application
memory. This model requires more powerful vulnerabilities compared to the threat model
used in related works like “Control-Flow Bending” [22] which permit the attacker only
a single write of attacker-controlled data to an arbitrary location.

However, it is not

unrealistic. Use-after-free bugs frequently afford repeatable memory read and write exploit
primitives from a single root cause, e.g. patched Google Chrome vulnerability CVE-20195786 [47]. Carlini et al. found that a single call to printf is enough for Turing-complete
memory computation [22]. Hu et al. additionally showed that data-only attacks (on realworld vulnerabilities) can permit Turing-complete computation in process memory using a
technique they termed data-oriented programming (DOP) [40]. Using DOP, an attacker
can leverage a single bug to achieve Turing complete computation on application memory
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(although DOP does not allow arbitrary interfacing outside the vulnerable application’s
address space as through system calls). The Turing-complete manipulation of memory in a
DOP attack is equivalent to our model: the attacker can read memory, perform arbitrary
computations on that data, and write data back to memory repeatedly.
We also assume that the attacker cannot cause the application to deviate from a feasible
legitimate execution trace. In other words, the attacker is constrained to data-only attacks
as defined by Carlini et al. This category of attack does not modify control data such as
indirect branch targets or return addresses, with one exception: the attacker may write an
indirect branch target as long as it is identical to a possible legitimate target of the call sites
where it is used. For example, we allow the attacker to construct and write data structures
that include function pointers for “handler” functions as long as one of the legitimate possible
handler functions is used. In this specific sense, our model is a more restrictive type of attack
compared to control-flow bending, which allows any control-flow transfer as long as the edge
exists in the static control-flow graph. For example, control-flow bending allows a function
to modify its own return address as long as the return target is another possible return site
for that function. Control-flow bending thus allows sequences of control-flow transfer that
are not possible in legitimate execution so long as each individual transfer corresponds to
an edge in the legitimate control-flow graph. In contrast, data-only attacks only produce
sequences of transfer that could appear in a legitimate execution. This property makes dataonly attacks particularly hard to defend against, because they not only conform to any static
CFI technology, but also to dynamic control-flow enforcement systems like shadow stacks.

4.1.1

Experimental Setup

We simulated this condition by writing a static nginx module that allows a remote attacker
to read or write arbitrary memory addresses. Static nginx modules are added into the nginx
binary at compile time. They therefore execute as part of the nginx binary with access to
the same address space. Our module defines a handler for a specific URL, which allows the
client to perform one of three actions:
1. read: read an arbitrary number of bytes from an arbitrary address.
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2. write: write some bytes to an arbitrary address.
3. relread (relative read): read an arbitrary number of bytes from an arbitrary offset
from the ngx http request t struct corresponding to the request.
This model mimics two possible scenarios. First, it models a condition where the client
can exploit one or more memory safety vulnerabilities to obtain repeatable arbitrary memory
reads and writes. It also models a condition where the client can achieve Turing-complete
computation from a single exploit, as if through DOP [40]. The model abstracts and unifies
these two exploit scenarios and greatly simplifies exploit development for the CFI bypass
proof-of-concept.
We used nginx version 1.19.5 on a server running on Debian 10 (buster), with default
runtime protections including full address-space layout randomization (ASLR) with positionindependent executable and WˆX. The exploit was executed from a separate laptop sending
requests over a private local network.

4.2

The Attack

The attack exploits weak memory protections in Linux to overwrite non-writable memory.
We target non-writable executable code pages to execute arbitrary code. The attack uses
proc/self/mem, a file in the procfs pseudofile system that exposes access to the virtual
address space of a process through a file-like interface. Critically, accesses to memory through
this interface ignore page read/write/execute permissions.

4.3

File I/O Gadgets

The proc/mem attack requires that the attacker can write to a controlled offset of a particular
file path through a “file-offset” data-oriented gadget. This requirement is a higher bar than
a simple arbitrary file write, which would only write to the beginning of a file. Here, the
attacker must control all of the following:
1. The file path;
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2. The data to be written;
3. And, the offset to write to.
At first this requirement may not seem realistic; however, we find that both the ubiquitous
stdio library of libc and the nginx filesystem abstraction layer (which is implemented
independently from libc) use data structures that track file offsets. An attacker can modify
the fields of these data structures to direct corresponding writes to a desired offset.
Furthermore, the attacker does not require a single code path that both opens a controlled
file path and performs the file-offset write. Instead, they can use two distinct data-oriented
gadgets: one to open the desired path, and one to write at an offset. As long as the attackercontrolled path remains open, the attacker can substitute that file descriptor number into
the file-offset write operation.

4.3.1

File-Offset Gadgets

First, the attacker needs a data-oriented gadget to write to a specific offset of a file. Generally
this can be accomplished where the application or library tracks the file offset independently
of the operating system, and contains code that transparently adjusts the offset before
writing. We found that this is the case in both nginx’s custom filesystem code and libc’s
stdio. Each used data structures that were expressive enough to permit data-only attacks
controlling both the file descriptor and offset of a write.

4.3.2

File Open Gadgets

The attacker must also be able to trigger the opening of a specific file path. Once that file is
open for writing, its descriptor can be substituted freely in other data structures used for file
I/O in the process, even code that would never use a descriptor originating from targeted
open call.
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4.4

Proof-of-Concept

To demonstrate the attack, we created a proof-of-concept exploit for a simulated vulnerability
in the open-source nginx web server [10]. We modified a local copy of the source code
to intentionally introduce a weakness simulating a vulnerability. These modifications are
detailed in Section 4.1.1.
The following are the high-level steps to the exploit:
1. Obtain pointer leaks to infer the randomized virtual memory mappings of the nginx
binary, stack, heap, and libc
2. Insert the path “/proc/self/mem” to a list of open log files, and use a data-only attack
to induce a re-opening of all log files. This creates a valid file descriptor referring to
this file, but does not write to it.
3. Modify the in-memory data structures representing the server config to insert an
additional proxy route to an attacker-controlled server.
4. Send a request to the newly-inserted proxy route. The attacker-controlled server
artificially slows its response over an interval of several seconds.
5. While the server response is pending, the attacker initiates additional requests to leak
heap memory until it locates the data structures corresponding to the pending slow
response.
6. Modify the response data structures of the slow response as if the response were using
temporary file buffering, using a crafted object with the file descriptor set to the open
/proc/self/mem, the offset set to the virtual address of the nginx code, and the buffer
pointing to a payload to execute.

4.4.1

Arbitrary File Open

The first step is to use a data-only attack to open a file path of the attacker’s choosing and
hold the file descriptor open. We will later use this descriptor in the file-offset write attack.
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This principle applies not only to this particular proof-of-concept, but also in general: the
attacker can use one code path to first open a file and another to write to it. Thus, the
attack does not need a single data-oriented gadget that is expressive enough to meet all the
requirements at once.
In the case of nginx, a global variable was used to trigger reopening of log files. The log
files were also stored in a global list data structure. We were able to modify the list of log
files to insert an entry to proc/self/mem. Then, writing a 1 to the ngx reopen variable
caused the process to open our path. Listing 4.1 shows a sample of the relevant code.

4.4.2

File-Offset Write

Nginx is unusual in that it avoids using a standard C file library in favor of its own filesystem
abstraction implementation. However, like libc, its file-related data structures implement
offset tracking with transparent seeking. These data structures are therefore an appropriate
target for a file-offset write data-oriented gadget.
Listing 4.2 shows an interesting subset of the data structures nginx uses to represent files
and temporary files. Nginx uses these structures for most file I/O tasks, with the notable
exception of log files. One feature that does use these structures is the use of temporary
files for proxied response buffering via the proxy temp path config directive [9]. Our exploit
makes use of the code path for this feature.
Listing 4.3 further shows how this data field is used in writing to temporary files. The
function ngx write chain to temp file takes the value from the offset field and uses it
as the offset for the write. Furthermore, the ngx event pipe t structure encapsulates both
the temporary file structure and the buffer structure that determines the file’s contents. As
a result, control of the single ngx event pipe t object on this code path permits a data-only
attack to control the file descriptor, contents, and offset of the file write.
Note that the attacker also must control the file path, not only the descriptor. While
this same data structure does carry file path information, the code uses this field to create a
temporary file, refusing to open it if it already exists. Because the proc/mem attack targets
an existing file path, the path field cannot be used. Instead, we use an independent data-only
attack to obtain a valid file descriptor for proc/self/mem as detailed in Section 4.4.1.
54

if ( ngx_reopen ) {
ngx_reopen = 0;
ngx_log_error ( NGX_LOG_NOTICE , cycle - > log , 0 , " reopening logs " )

1
2
3

;
ngx_reopen_files ( cycle , -1) ;

4
5

}

Listing 4.1: A global variable can cause log files to be re-opened, allowing the attacker to
obtain a file descriptor for an arbitrary path.

1
2
3
4
5

typedef struct ngx_file_s {
ngx_fd_t
// ...
off_t
} ngx_file_t ;

fd ;
offset ;

6
7
8
9
10
11
12

typedef struct {
ngx_file_t
off_t
ngx_path_t
// ...
} ngx_temp_file_t ;

file ;
offset ;
* path ;

Listing 4.2: Data structures used by nginx to represent files. These structures encapsulate
the three elements needed for the data-only attack: the path file descriptor and offset for
file writes.

1
2
3
4
5

6

ssize_t
n g x _ w r i t e _ c h a i n _ t o _ t e m p _ f i l e ( ngx_temp_file_t * tf , ngx_chain_t * chain )
{
// ...
return n g x _ w r i t e _ c h a i n _ t o _ f i l e (& tf - > file , chain , tf - > offset , tf - > pool )
;
}

Listing 4.3: Code snippet showing how nginx uses the file descriptor and offset from the data
structure for writing.
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4.4.3

Creating a Favorable Configuration

Having noted ngx event pipe t as a worthwhile target, the attacker must determine a code
path using this structure that is reachable in the course of legitimate control flow. By
examining the function call graph and source code, we identified the response buffering
feature as an interesting target. This feature allows buffering of large request and response
to temporary files on disk, and it is highly configurable for options like file path, size, and
more [9]. It also is only used for proxy routes — URLs configured to serve data from an
upstream server.
Ideally, our attack should not rely on any particular pre-existing configuration. Instead
we can use a data-only attack to modify the in-memory data structures that represent
the configuration and manipulate the configured behavior of nginx.

This is relatively

straightforward because this configuration data is stored in writable memory, as is typical
for dynamic configuration data parsed from a config file. We used an iterative process
to construct configuration data structures and insert them into process memory (other
research has suggested that this process can be automated, potentially reducing barriers to
exploitation [40]). The iterative process involved inserting minimal copies of configuration
structures into memory under a debugger, breaking when an error occurred, and revising the
data structure until the desired behavior was achieved. Using this method we were able to
insert data structures representing a new proxy route in a server that previously had none
configured.
This case study suggests that data-only attacks can configure almost any behavior the
application is capable of under normal execution. Hence, attackers may have access to
greatly expanded attack surface by modifying runtime configuration in order to induce
whatever state facilitates further exploitation. In other words, data-only attacks can be
chained together to reach data-oriented gadgets not otherwise accessible.

4.4.4

Extending Object Lifetime

The last remaining challenge for completing the proof-of-concept is to actually locate and
overwrite the ngx event pipe t structure in-memory after it is created but before it is used.
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The typical lifetime of an ngx event pipe t object makes this non-trivial: an object is
created to handle the request and destroyed when the request is completed. It may be
possible to locate and overwrite this object during the lifetime of a single request using a
data-oriented programming attack. Such an attack could find the object in memory and
make the necessary changes using Turing-complete computation [40]. However in this case
we found that it was possible to proceed without resorting to this technique.
Instead we artificially extended the lifetime of an ngx event pipe t object by taking
advantage of high-level application behavior. In Section 4.4.3 we described inserting a proxy
route to expose the code path containing the file-offset write gadget. We can use the same
proxy route to extend the lifetime of an ngx event pipe t object. By setting the proxy
route to an attacker-controlled server, the attacker can artificially delay responses to create
long-lived response objects in memory. The attacker sends a request to the newly-configured
and artificially slowed proxy route. Concurrent requests sent by the attacker then have a
comfortable window to locate and modify the corresponding ngx event pipe t object in
memory.

4.4.5

Finalizing the Attack

With the slow request pending, we send concurrent requests repeatedly leaking parts of
heap memory until the ngx event pipe t object is found. We then overwrite it with a
crafted object containing the file descriptor for proc/self/mem, an offset corresponding to
the virtual address of the non-writable executable code segment, and a buffer containing the
machine code payload. Nginx uses these fields to perform a write to the proc/self/mem
file at the specified offset. This interface ignores page read/write/execute permissions and
copies the payload directly into unwritable executable memory. When the syscall completes,
control is returned to the attacker-controlled machine code.
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4.5

Discussion

This proof of concept suggests that the proc/mem is feasible, but aspects of our attack
depended on the specific structure of Nginx’s file I/O layer. To some extent, all dataoriented attacks are situational since they rely on the particular operations available in the
application’s control-flow graph; however, file writing data-oriented gadgets are common.
Data-oriented attacks targeting file writes have been show to be possible in a variety of
common software before [22], and the proc/mem technique can convert these into arbitrary
code execution as long as the attacker can control the file offset.
Still, the question remains how common not only are file write gadgets, but file offsetwrite gadgets. To help answer this question we examine the most common file I/O library
for C applications on Linux, the GNU standard C library glibc.

4.5.1

File-Offset Data Gadgets in glibc

It turns out that the ubiquitous GNU standard C library contains a gadget very similar to
the one exploited in Nginx. Listing 4.4 shows part of the code that constitutes the file-offset
write gadget.

When glibc flushes a file’s buffers to disk, it checks and possibly calls

seek before write. Figure 4.1 shows the data flow from the FILE* data structure to the
parameters of both calls. Hence, all of the necessary parameters for the proc/mem technique
are attacker-controlled in a data-only attack. Furthermore, glibc automatically flushes all
open FILE*s when they are closed or the application exits, so the attacker may not even need
to be able to reach a code path that actually performs a file write in the course of normal
execution. In other words, there are only two prerequisites to performing the proc/mem
attack with glibc:
1. The attacker must be able to persuade the application to obtain and keep a file
descriptor for proc/self/mem;
2. The attacker must be able to overwrite a FILE* structure.
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if ( fp - > _IO_read_end != fp - > _IO_write_base )
{
off64_t new_pos
= _IO_SYSSEEK ( fp , fp - > _IO_write_base - fp - > _IO_read_end , 1) ;
if ( new_pos == _IO_pos_BAD )
return 0;
fp - > _offset = new_pos ;
}
count = _IO_SYSWRITE ( fp , data , to_do ) ;

Listing 4.4: A snippet of code from glibc showing how file buffers are synced to the file
system allowing the attacker to control the offset.

Figure 4.1: A data dependency graph illustrating how all parameters to a seek() and
write() call are controlled by a single data structure in the standard C library, constituting
a file-offset write data gadget.
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We believe these two criteria are frequently met in real-world memory corruption
vulnerabilities.

As future work, we propose a survey of common software using past

vulnerabilities to obtain a better estimate for how widely-applicable the proc/mem attack is.
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Chapter 5
Strengthening Executable Memory
Protections
In the previous sections we showed how weak memory protections in Linux can violate
key assumptions in defense systems. We now set out to mitigate these gaps. Not only
do we want to block the known vectors for tampering with executable memory, we also
must minimize attack surface and systematically validate the patches to achieve the highest
possible confidence that the system is secure. Our goal is to engineer a system that brings
real-world code into as close alignment as possible with WˆX assumptions. Accordingly,
we want to prevent all unauthorized changes to both contents and layout of executable
memory after program initialization is complete, including both direct changes via memory
accesses and indirect changes via the kernel. As a secondary goal, we want to allow some
explicitly authorized and specifically defined changes to executable memory in order to
support applications that require it, such as JIT compilers.
First, we introduce a new syscall xlock that permanently “locks” the executable address
space and memory contents of the calling process. The purpose of this syscall is to make our
changes to the memory permissions model “opt-in.” That is, each individual process must
explicitly request the enhanced code integrity enforcement policy. Thus, security-sensitive
applications, such as services exposed to the internet, can benefit from increased protection
without threatening system-wide stability in the presence of other applications that may not
be compatible with the xlock model.
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Finally, we validate our implementation using custom modifications to PeX, an automatic
Linux permissions checking framework [81].

5.1

Goals

The goal of the xlock system is to provide a robust and comprehensive guarantee of
executable code integrity for the lifetime of a process. xlock can thus be used either on
its own to prevent code injection as part of an exploit chain, or as a foundation for other
systems rely on code immutability as part of the WˆX assumption.

5.2

Design

The xlock syscall is designed to lock all executable memory in a process. When a process
wants to prevent further modifications to its code, it may call the xlock syscall and check
the return value to ensure the call succeeds. After the call is made, it sets a flag in the kernel
data structure associated with the process, marking the process as xlocked. This flag cannot
be unset from userspace. The design of the xlock system includes a setup phase that pins all
executable pages in memory, added permission checks for memory-related operations, and
optional configurable exceptions for loading vetted dynamic libraries or JIT pages.

5.2.1

Setup

The setup phase executes immediately in the kernel when the xlock syscall is invoked.
This phase traverses the virtual memory mapping of the calling process, pins all executable
pages in memory, and detaches them from any backings such as files or shared memory. In
the language of the Linux kernel, this effectively converts all executable pages into private,
anonymous mappings. If a page is not yet loaded, this phase allocates physical memory
for it and copies it from disk. The mapping is then updated to remove its reference to the
backing, preventing changes from propagating to the physical memory.
On its own, this step effectively prevents several of the attacks detailed in Section
3.2. Many of these attacks exploited executable memory mappings that were backed by
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a mutable resource such as a file. Although the memory mapping itself was non-writable,
an attacker could circumvent memory mapping permissions by modifying the underlying
resource directly. In many cases, the kernel would then propagate these changes to physical
memory. We rule out this class of vulnerability by moving all executable pages to physical
memory and unlinking them from any other backing.

5.2.2

Permission Checks

Setting the xlock flag also enables a set of enhanced permission checks for certain memoryrelated syscalls. Any operation that causes a change to the process’s executable code should
be denied. These checks must be added to syscalls that have a straightforward ability to
change executable code like mmap and mprotect, but also to interfaces with more obscure
code-modifying properties like mremap, proc/self/mem, and ptrace. It is a major challenge
to locate and add checks to every possible kernel code path that could modify memory
mappings or contents from userspace. Section 5.4 details our strategy for addressing this
challenge.

5.2.3

Dynamic Code

Some applications actually require changes to their executable code at runtime. Examples
include language interpreters, VMs, or emulators that use just-in-time (JIT) compiling to
produce executable machine code at runtime as well as applications supporting extensions or
plugins in the form of dynamic libraries. Ideally the xlock system would retain support for
these applications without allowing unauthorized modifications to code. The xlock syscall
allows the process to designate an external userspace process to act as the “gatekeeper” and
dictate access to new executable code.
The gatekeeper process communicates with the kernel using the ptrace interface and
runs with elevated privileges to protect it from tampering from the application. Whenever
the application maps a new range of executable pages using mmap, mprotect, or similar, the
kernel first maps these pages into the gatekeeper process as writable pages and notifies it of
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the new virtual address range. The gatekeeper is then free to read and modify the newlymapped pages (as well as the rest of the application’s memory), performing any desired
validation or sanitization. The gatekeeper then notifies the kernel to allow or disallow the
mapping change.
This architecture is flexible and allows any type of validation. For example, this design
could be used to enforce digital code signing. The gatekeeper can require that any executable
pages loaded dynamically have a valid digital signature from a trusted source.

5.3

Implementation

We implemented a subset of this design as a set of kernel patches, working on the Linux
kernel version 5.4.24. The implementation adds support for the xlock syscall including the
setup phase and set of new permission checks, but not the gatekeeper architecture.
The xlock syscall implementation traverses the virtual memory mapping of the calling
process and performs the following procedure for each executable mapping:
1. Ensures the pages are faulted into physical memory;
2. Allocates new physical memory and a new page table entries (pte) mapping to the
new pages;
3. Copies the memory contents of the mapping to the new pages;
4. Marks the pte(s) as readable and executable only;
5. Invalidates the page range in the MMU;
6. Closes any files associated with the vm area struct for the mapping;
7. Removes any backings associated with the vm area struct and marks it as anonymous;
8. Updates the permissions on the vm area struct, making it readable and executable
only.
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This procedure converts all executable mappings in the process to private and anonymous
mappings. Copying the contents of the mapping to new physical memory disassociates the
mapping from any shared memory, ensuring that the mapping is private (i.e., not shared
with any other mapping). Removing and closing any files associated with the mapping also
makes it anonymous (i.e., not associated with any file or other resource). Private, anonymous
mappings are thus immune to the entire class of memory-permission bypasses that depend
on inconsistent permissions for multiple mappings or associated backings because they are
not associated with any other resource or mapping.
The xlock syscall also irrevocably sets a flag in the task struct of the process that
marks it as executable-locked. When this flag is set, subsequent requests from userspace to
modify virtual memory mappings associated with executable code are denied. Our patch
adds checks to system calls such as mprotect, mmap, mremap, and more that are capable
or creating, moving, modifying, or deleting executable mappings as well as interfaces that
can bypass page protections such as the proc/self/mem pseudo-file. While the logic of the
checks is very straightfoward, discovering all such kernel code that may be reachable from
userspace is non-trivial. We detail our process for identifying locations that need new checks
as well as a comprehensive listing of added checks in the next section.

5.3.1

Userspace Support

In addition to kernel patches, we also wrote a small userspace library that adds an interface
for C/C++ and Python applications to the xlock syscall. This library allows applications
to explicitly call xlock after the dynamic linker finishes loading executable and library code.
We also developed an xlock shim command line utility that allows existing applications to
be executed with the strengthened xlock memory model without changes to the application.
The shim uses Linux’s dynamic linker to inject the shim library into the application at run
time. The library calls xlock after the application and library code is finished loading, but
before control transfers to the application’s main function. This tool is particularly useful
for adding drop-in support to binary applications where the user may not have access to
source code.
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5.4

Validation

As we argued in Section 3.3, interjecting a new security boundary into an existing and
sprawling code base is an error-prone process [81]. Developers have written millions of lines
of code and hundreds of kernel interfaces with a more permissive security model in mind. Any
of these interfaces may require new checks to enforce the new boundary. Relying on a manual
search of documentation and code carries a high risk of overlooking some functionality that
violates the desired security property. Of course, even a single overlooked check can render
all others moot. To address this challenge, we use static analysis to automatically discover
code paths reachable from userspace with the potential to modify userspace memory contents
or mappings. This approach is not totally fool-proof, but it does greatly reduce the manual
burden of discovering
We validated our changes and identified unchecked code paths using a modified version of
PeX, an automatic permissions checking framework for the Linux kernel by Zhang et al [81].
PeX uses the LLVM [13, 49] intermediate representation of the Linux kernel to construct a
call graph of the whole kernel image, resolving indirect calls using a heuristic called KIRIN.
The call-graph is then used to construct a more detailed interprocedural control-flow graph,
which links intra-procedure control flow graphs with edges between function calls and the
entry and exit points of possible callees. PeX then uses a set of known permission-check
functions to infer privileged functions and employs dominator analysis to identify privileged
functions that can be reached without a permission check. Finally, the tool outputs a list of
call stacks that reach the identified critical functions, both good (code paths with a permission
check) and bad (code paths missing a permission check).
While PeX supports automatically inferring privileged functions, for our purposes this
functionality results in unnecessary noise from unrelated code. We are instead focused on a
small set of particular functions that may manipulate memory contents or mappings. For
this reason, we modified a copy of the PeX framework to instead accept a configured list of
critical functions. By inspecting existing kernel code for functions like mmap and ptrace, we
formulated a list of internal utility functions used by the kernel for 1) modifying memory
protections of userspace mappings and 2) accessing userspace memory without enforcing
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memory protections. These functions are listed in Table 5.1. Likewise, we limited the set
of permission checks recognized by PeX to only include mm is xlocked, a utility function
added by our patch that checks if a process’ address space is executable-locked.
We first added checks at 6 known locations that could violate WˆX, using the attacks
detailed in Section 3.2. These checks served as a baseline to validate that PeX was indeed
able to identify the known cases as having good permission checks. In addition to correctly
identifying the 6 good permission checks, PeX also found 7 unchecked paths reaching critical
functions. Table 5.2 lists all checks added, both through our initial manual analysis and
through PeX output. Notably, PeX found 3 legacy system calls that are no longer in normal
use, but may still exist on some systems. It also found surprising functions such as madvise
that only violate the “executable-locked” invariant as a result of particular flags or options,
and not as the typical usage of the syscall.

5.5

Performance Impact

The performance affects of xlock can be broadly divided into three categories:
1. The one-time overhead of calling xlock after initialization.
2. The ongoing run-time overhead after calling xlock.
3. The effect on memory usage after calling xlock.
The one-time cost of calling the xlock syscall is small but measurable, and depends
on the size of the executable memory mapped by the process. We measure and report
the setup time for variously sized executables in Figure 5.1. For a process with 4.9MB of
mapped executable memory, the xlock syscall took approximately 2ms. Since this cost is
only incurred once during the program initialization, it is likely to be imperceptible to users.

The xlock system does not incur substantial run-time overhead in applications that
do not frequently map new executable code after calling xlock. The potential source of
run-time overhead is in the added permission checks (listed in Table 5.2), which must run
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Table 5.1: Critical functions used for discovering unchecked paths that could potentially
modify executable memory or mappings.
Function

Description

Modifies page protections.
Prepares to access userspace memory, explicitly ignoring page protections.
get user pages locked Identical to get user pages remote
when called with the FOLL REMOTE
flag.

vma set page prot
get user pages remote

Table 5.2: All kernel functions where mm is xlocked checks were added.
Function

Found

Description

ptrace may access
do mprotect pkey
do mmap
sys ptrace
mm access
sys mremap
sys uselib
do execve file
do munmap
sys remap file pages
do brk flags
apply vma lock flags
sys madvise

Manual
Manual
Manual
Manual
Manual
Manual
PeX
PeX
PeX
PeX
PeX
PeX
PeX

Internal permission check governing variety of operations on processes.
Changes memory mapping permissions.
Maps new memory.
ptrace syscall entrypoint.
Internal check for access to process’s virtual address space.
Syscall that may move mappings.
Deprecated syscall for loading libraries.
Used to execute new programs.
Unmaps memory.
Deprecated syscall that can move mappings.
Legacy memory management syscall.
Internal helper function used by mlock family that may change mapping permissions.
Syscall that may unmap pages.

68

Figure 5.1: Benchmark for cost of calling xlock, as a minimum and median of 10,000 runs
each for various sized executables. There is a linear relationship between executable size
and setup time, which corresponds to the time required to reallocate private, anonymous
memory and possibly read from disk for each executable page. This cost is only incurred
once, at application initialization.
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for all userspace applications (even ones that do not user xlock). The added permission
checks, when inlined, amount to a single additional memory access and conditional branch.
Furthermore, since the checks all reside in code paths that modify virtual memory mappings
or bypass page protections, none of them are called frequently in typical workloads. Overall,
the effect of the added checks in rarely-used code results in no measurable performance
penalty at run-time.
In terms of memory use, xlock requires pinning all executable pages in main memory.
While this does not increase the virtual memory usage of a process, it does put additional
pressure on system physical memory by precluding use of demand paging. We calculate an
estimate for increased physical memory usage by measuring the number of executable pages
not resident in physical memory in during a sample execution of a program. Our results are
listed in Table 5.3. Exact numbers for demand paging systems will depend on a particular
execution path, as only pages actually executed become resident. Still, these measurements
indicate that the extra physical memory usage is generally on the order of a few megabytes,
which is acceptable in the context of modern server or desktop systems with several gigabytes
of physical memory.

5.6

Comparison to SELinux

SELinux provides controls that can prevent some methods for injecting executable code at
runtime, but they stop short of ensuring total code integrity [12]. Table 5.4 lists these checks
and the operations that they apply to. These restrictions can enforce the WˆX policy on page
permissions, ensuring that no mapping that is or has been written to can also be executed.
However, as we have seen, this does not translate to a guarantee of code integrity. Executablemapped files can be modified without ever mapping them writable. Shared memory mappings
can refer to the same physical memory with different permissions. The kernel provides
interfaces that can modify memory contents regardless of mapping permissions, such as
ptrace—an operation that bypasses all existing checks, including those of SELinux, when
the thread group of the target matches that of the caller. In short, SELinux can ensure that
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Table 5.3: Estimate for resident memory increase incurred by xlock in common server
software.
Software

Memory Increase

OpenSSH (7.9p1)
2.4 MB
Python (3.7.3)
1.0 MB
Nginx worker (1.19.5)
1.1 MB
JVM (OpenJDK 11.0.9) 9.6 MB

Table 5.4: Executable-memory related controls provided by SELinux, and the corresponding
operation they allow or deny.
Permission

Operation

execmod
execmem
execstack
execheap

Mark page executable that was previously writable.
Map a page both executable and writable.
Map any part of the stack executable.
Map any part of the heap executable.
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memory mappings adhere to the basic form of the WˆX policy, but cannot guarantee code
immutability.

5.7

Discussion

The xlock system systemically strengthens the WˆX assumption on Linux. It fixes an
important subset of the known attacks on PKU-based intra-process isolation architectures
and prevents the proc/mem attack as a bypass for control-flow integrity.

The WˆX

assumption is fundamental to the design of both systems, so gaps in its implementation
on Linux can undermine the security of each. A CFI system can call xlock as part of
its initialization, thereby preventing the proc/mem attack and other potentially unknown
violations of WˆX in the protected application or via the kernel. By copying all executable
memory into private, anonymous mappings, xlock excludes an entire class of known attacks
that rely permission inconsistencies between mappings and their backing resources. The use
of static analysis to automatically detect missing checks further bolsters confidence that the
new xlock permission checks are comprehensive.
While our work focuses on userspace memory mappings, previous work has uncovered
WˆX violations and exploited them in the context of kernel memory mappings. Liakh et
al. used a formal model to detect violations of WˆX in kernel memory permissions [50].
Kemerlis et al. later demonstrated the “ret2dir” attack, which is conceptually similar in
that it exploits dually-mapped pages with inconsistent permissions to bypass Supervisor
Mode Access Prevention (SMAP) in kernel exploits [44].
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Chapter 6
Improved Architecture for
PKU-based Isolation
Using the lessons learned from previous work, we propose an improved architecture for
intra-process isolation that remains efficient but better facilitates secure implementation. In
Section 3 we described novel weaknesses that we found in two similar PKU-based intraprocess isolation systems, although they were each designed and implemented independently
of the other. We analyzed the root cause of these weaknesses and argued that they stem
from similar design choices. As a class, the vulnerabilities shared a common cause: the
kernel, unaware of intra-process boundaries and authorized to access all process resources,
could be manipulated into violating the intra-process security model. Although each of these
loopholes could be individually fixed by changing some implementation details, preventing
the class of vulnerabilities requires a systemic solution.
We propose an architectural change that would fundamentally modify the way the kernel
views intra-process components in order to mitigate this class of attacks. Our change allows
the kernel to treat intra-process components as separate process for most purposes, without
requiring any explicit interaction with, or additional context switches to, the kernel. In
this architecture each intra-process component is associated with a “virtual” process which
we call a coprocess, spawned by the primary process. Coprocesses are never scheduled and
cannot run independently of the primary, but they encapsulate a set of process resources
that is almost totally independent of the primary.
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Our design retains essentially the same model for intra-process isolation from a userspace
perspective: the application can designate certain portions of its code to act as the trusted
component, and allocate memory that is accessible only from the trusted component. The
untrusted component can enter the trusted components only through validated call gates
consisting of a wrpkru instruction followed immediately by a jump to the trusted code.
Unsafe wrpkru gadgets can be neutralized either by static rewriting (as in ERIM) or dynamic
hardware breakpoints (as in Hodor).
However, the coprocess architecture substantially changes the kernel model for intraprocess isolation. As the seccomp filter exploit in Section 3.2.5 illustrated, memory cannot
be securely isolated without also isolating other intra-process resources. Otherwise, it is
possible for the untrusted component to indirectly and surreptitiously influence behavior of
other components. In order to isolate non-memory resources and mitigate kernel confuseddeputy attacks, we model intra-process components as separate processes to the kernel for
most purposes. We also integrate the xlock system described in Section 5 in order to preserve
the required static invariant of application code that no exploitable wrpkru exists.

6.1

Background and Goals

In general, the purpose of intra-process isolation is to mitigate the impact of an application
or library vulnerability by efficiently separating in-process components. A single bug can
allow attackers to cause the impacted component to behave arbitrarily [66]. In a traditional
non-isolated process, such an exploit potentially exposes any resource accessible to the entire
process, which frequently includes data that is irrelevant to the vulnerable component [29].
Many works describe methods for limiting access between intra-process components without
resorting to the overhead required for a full context switch between the kernel or another
process [25, 52, 46, 53, 74, 77, 23, 32, 59]. The fastest, ERIM and Hodor, use specialized
hardware known as Protection Keys for Userspace (PKU) [38, 72].
Our contribution refines these two systems by accounting for practical concerns with
secure development, using lessons learned in Section 3. We outline architectural modifications to this scheme that help facilitate secure implementation. In other words, our goal
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is to minimize the opportunity for implementation weaknesses caused by human error both
during initial development and subsequent maintenance.
Of course, we also endeavor to limit overhead to an acceptable level; intra-process isolation
is useless if it doesn’t outperform traditional context switching.

6.1.1

Component Model

For simplicity, our model for intra-process components primarily focuses on dividing the
process into a trusted and untrusted component, defining privileged blocks of code which
together form the trusted component. These blocks of code exist within functions, not as
self-contained and separate callable functions. Components are orthogonal to scheduling.
Threads enter and leave the trusted component depending on the code they are executing
at the moment.
This model simplifies certain design considerations, but it can also be easily expanded to
accommodate multiple independent components or modified to correlate components with
other entities such as threads, functions, or libraries.

6.1.2

Threat Model

We continue to operate under a similar threat model used in comparable works [72, 38], with
a small change. We assume the following:
1. The attacker may freely read and write memory in the untrusted component, subject
to page table permissions.
2. The attacker can arbitrarily manipulate the control flow of execution in the untrusted
component, but cannot inject new executable code.
3. Any unsafe wrpkru gadgets have been neutralized either through static rewriting [72,
71], dynamically-inserted hardware breakpoints [38], or a similar technique.
4. The hardware, kernel, and linker will not behave maliciously, although they may be
agnostic of intra-process boundaries.
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5. The application is trusted up until a coprocess is initialized (in practice, this means
initializing the coprocess before exposing attack surface).
We do not state as an assumption that our implementation is secure, although we will argue
why we believe it is more likely to be secure compared to other designs.

6.2

Design and Prototype

The design encompasses the following:
1. New kernel code and data structures to dynamically look up and use the isolated
coprocess structure as a proxy for the ordinary process control block in most operations;
2. New options for the clone syscall for informing the kernel of new isolated components
by spawning a new coproc;
3. A statically-linked library providing userspace support for creating coprocesses,
swapping between them, and allocating isolated memory.
4. The xlock system, underlying the assumption of executable code immutability.

6.2.1

Kernel Internals

We model intra-process components as coprocesses, which appear as independent child
processes in the process tree of the primary process that created them. Each coprocess
has an associated PKRU value that grants it access to isolated memory, as well as a nearly
complete independent set of process attributes from the kernel’s perspective.
Process Control Block
In the Linux kernel, each process is represented by a C structure known as task struct. The
coprocess system allocates an additional task struct for each coprocess and dynamically
substitutes the appropriate one while in kernel space. This structure holds (either directly
or by reference) all information about a process such as PID, user and group IDs, memory
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mappings, file descriptor tables, and more. The definition for this massive structure spans
almost 700 lines of code and includes approximately 250 fields (although the exact number
varies depending on the build configuration).
The coprocess design assigns each component its own task struct in the kernel. A
primary process maintains an array of its coprocesses as pointers to task struct structures,
indexed by the protection key associated with that component. Coprocesses likewise keep
a pointer to their primary. This data structure is illustrated in Figure 6.1. Coprocess
component swaps remain entirely in userspace and primarily mediated through the PKRU.
When a coprocess or primary does enter the kernel for some reason (syscall, interrupt, etc.)
the kernel reads the PKRU value to determine which coprocess, if any, is active. Figure 6.2
visualizes a simple example of two different intra-process components each making a call to
getpid.
This design causes the in-process components to automatically inherit most of the existing
inter-process security boundary enforcement of the kernel. For example, file I/O system calls
issued from one component cannot possibly access or change the file descriptors opened for
another component, absent a bug in the existing security model of the kernel. This property
is achieved only by virtue of isolating the task struct structures, without any changes to
kernel file I/O code. The same principle applies to other process resources and metadata
such as seccomp filters, namespaces, and more.
However, some fields of the task struct remain shared between intra-process components: namely, the scheduling, memory map, and CPU context. We detail the changes
needed to facilitate these shared resources in Subsection 6.2.4.
The current Process
The kernel source code refers to the task struct of the running process through the current
macro, so by modifying this macro we can substitute the task struct of the current
coprocess for the task struct of the primary. On x86, the current macro is a synonym
for a trivial function which returns a per-CPU global variable, shown in Listing 6.1. The
global variable is nothing more than an ordinary pointer to a task struct that is set in the
kernel in the course of scheduling a new process on a core. Subsequent traps to the kernel via
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Figure 6.1: Each process maintains an array associating protection keys to coprocesses, and
each coprocess maintains a reference to its primary.

1
2
3
4

static __always_inline struct task_struct * get_current ( void )
{
return t h i s _ c p u _ r e a d _ s t a b l e ( current_task ) ;
}

5
6

# define current get_current ()

Listing 6.1: The usual definition of the current macro simply returns the per-CPU variable
representing the task currently running on the CPU.

1
2
3
4

static __always_inline struct task_struct * get_current ( void )
{
struct task_struct * tsk = t h i s _ c p u _ r e a d _ s t a b l e ( current_task ) ;
struct task_struct * coproc ;

5

coproc = get_coproc ( tsk , safe_rdpkru () ) ;
if ( unlikely ( coproc ) ) return coproc ;

6
7
8

return tsk ;

9
10

}

Listing 6.2: The patched current definition potentially returns a different struct depending
on the current state of the PKRU register.
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Figure 6.2: Every reference to the currently running process from the kernel uses the current
PKRU value to lookup an individual task struct encapsulating isolated process resources
for the appropriate coprocess.
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syscall, interrupt, or similar do not modify this variable until the kernel explicitly schedules
a new process.
A simple change, illustrated in Listing 6.2, causes current to find the correct coprocess.
Now, the value of PKRU register is used to index a 16-element array of pointers to the
task structs of possible coprocesses. This modification transparently causes the kernel to
differentiate between intra-process components, segregating shared resources automatically.
This single change has wide-reaching effects, since nearly all kernel code that deals with
userspace references the current process. Table 6.1 provides our accounting of current usages
and related references. The macro is referenced over 9000 times in the Linux source code
(although the number of those references that are actually reachable depends on the build
configuration). Even with a minimal configuration that excludes many common feature and
options from compilation, task struct members are accessed many thousands of times in
the resulting binary. Changing the current macro effectively instruments several thousand
accesses to make them aware of intra-process components by default, all at once.

6.2.2

System Interface

Because coprocesses are primarily orchestrated in userspace, the system interface for them
is quite small. We modified the clone system call [5] to support a new optional flag
(CLONE COPROC) indicating that a new coprocess should be created. The clone syscall is an
overloaded system call that can be used interchangeably with fork or can be used to create
new threads, so it is natural to extend it to create new coprocesses as well. In response, the
system returns both the PID and the protection key (between 1 and 15, inclusive) associated
with the new coprocess. However, unlike a conventional clone or fork operation, the call
returns only once, since coprocesses are not schedulable on their own.
Userspace manages switches between components, so no new kernel interface is needed
for this purpose.
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Table 6.1: Summary of statistics on usage of current macro and task struct references in
the Linux kernel source code.
Operation

References

current (Minimal Config, LLVM)
current (All Source)
task struct dereferences (Minimal Config, LLVM IR)

400
9169
7846
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6.2.3

Userspace Support

Userspace support for coprocesses comprises a thin static library called libcoproc providing
convenience wrappers and macros for common functionality. A coproc function creates
a new coprocess and returns the PID and protection key for it.

A pair of macros

(coproc swap to trusted and coproc swap to untrusted) expands to secure call gates [72]
for component swapping. The library is statically linked to avoid breaking intra-process
boundaries by forcing a trusted component to rely on a potentially untrusted global offset
table for calling out to libcoproc.

6.2.4

Shared Resources and Edge Cases

Most kernel subsystems transparently handle the dynamically-retrieved current process
without modification, but some require special treatment. Some code must be modified to
explicitly share certain intra-process resources, such as the virtual address space and FPU
context. Others need to adopt slightly different semantics in the context of a coprocesses.
Virtual Address Space. Coprocesses must share a virtual address space, because there is
no opportunity to change out page tables during a userspace-only context switch. The PKU
hardware instead mediates access to subsets of the address space assigned to the trusted
component. Such an arrangement is not unprecedented; threads in Linux are essentially just
processes that share a reference to the same virtual address space. Hence, existing kernel
code is already savvy to the possibility of shared address space between different processes
and no further changes are needed to facilitate the sharing.
Scheduling. Since coprocesses are never scheduled, they necessitate some changes to the
Linux scheduling system. The Linux scheduling code is modular and allows individual
processes to use different schedulers. Coprocesses are simply assigned a custom scheduler
that never queues the coprocess. Instead, when the primary process is scheduled, the last
PKRU value is restored which effectively restores the correct coprocess context.
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FPU Context. When the kernel switches between processes, it stores the userspace FPU
context of the old process (which includes the PKRU value) in a member of the current’s
task struct. A surprising side effect of the “by-default” isolation of process resources was
that the FPU context was stored to the task struct of the current coprocess—but restored
from that of the primary process, since this process is the one that is actually scheduled.
This behavior caused the wrong PKRU value to be restored during some context switches
between userspace processes. We addressed this bug by explicitly sharing FPU context
between coprocesses.
Signals. As a mechanism that interrupts ordinary scheduling of a process and suddenly
jumps to different code, signal handling poses some problems for intra-process isolation.
Our solution is to redirect all signals sent to coprocesses to their primary, which can handle
the signal with an unprivileged PKRU value. Signal delivery can also be delayed while
executing in a trusted component to avoid preempting critical code. Signal returns that
attempt to assign a privileged PKRU value should be denied.
Exiting. When any coprocess exits, the primary and all other coprocesses also exit.

6.3

Performance

We expect the performance characteristics of coprocesses to be closely related to its
predecessors that perform context switching in a similar way, though a new source of
additional overhead may lie in the more intensive logic of our modified current lookup.
With these facts in mind, we replicate some previous measurements of the performance
characteristics of PKU itself, and then perform a realistic benchmark of Nginx throughput
running with the prototype coprocess system.

6.3.1

Experimental Setup

We ran all of the benchmarks on our server, which has an Intel Xeon Silver 4208 CPU with 8
physical cores running at 2.10GHz. We disabled power optimizations and frequency scaling,

83

and for microbenchmarks used a technique published by Intel to measure clock cycles used
for short sequences of instructions [65]. For the throughput benchmarks, tests were run in
a virtual machine running our modified kernel, assigned to 4 physical cores on our machine.
The prototype was executed in a containerized environment, and the ab (Apache Bench) [7]
tool was used to connect to the Nginx instance over a virtual ethernet pair. Software versions
used included Nginx 1.20.1 linked to OpenSSL 1.1.1k, running on Debian 10 (Buster) with
Linux kernel version 5.4.24.

6.3.2

Microbenchmarks

We measured the cost, in clock cycles, of PKU-based “context switch” compared to a kernel
context switch. The actual cost of a context switch depends on a number of applicationspecific factors such as the state of the CPU pipeline, caching of contiguous code, and
possible TLB misses, but these numbers provide a rough idea of the baseline cost of executing
particular instructions. We compare a gated direct function call with a trivial system call,
getpid. A gated direct function call consists of a direct call instruction to a trivial function,
instrumented with additional instructions to change the PKRU value before and after the
function call. The function itself simply returns a value from memory. The result given in
Table 6.2 confirm previous measurements [72], which indicated that a gated direct function
call is more than twice as fast as a trivial system call.

6.3.3

Throughput Measurement

We integrated our prototype with Nginx [10] and OpenSSL [11] to protect long-term
private keys (i.e., RSA keys) in application memory and measured the effect on web server
performance. Our experiment was designed to be comparable to the same measurements
taken for ERIM [72].
Instrumentation
Nginx was statically linked to libcoproc and modified to initialize a new coprocess to act
as the trusted component for each Nginx worker. We then linked this version of Nginx
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Table 6.2: Microbenchmarks comparing the costs of different forms of intra-process
component switches. A trivial system call is approximately three times as slow as a gated
direct function call (a wrpkru followed by a trivial function call followed by another wrpkru).
Operation

Cost (Cycles)

wrpkru
20
Gated direct function call 42
getpid()
126
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with a modified OpenSSL library that switched to the trusted coprocess before each RSA
decryption, and switched back to the untrusted context afterwards.
Measurements
We measured median total throughput across 10 runs of 100000 requests each using ab, with
a concurrency of 300 threads. Nginx was configured to serve static web pages filled with
random text content of various sizes, using the ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 cipher
suite with 4096-bit RSA private keys. We used one Nginx worker.
Recall that our kernel changes carry possible performance implications even for nonisolated processes by introducing new logic to the ubiquitous current macro. This macro
is used very frequently, so even the minimal amount of new code that checks for a possible
coprocess causes measurable overhead. Accordingly, we divide our measurements into three
groups:
1. Unmodified Nginx/OpenSSL running in an unmodified Linux kernel.
2. Unmodified Nginx/OpenSSL running in our Linux kernel that supports coprocesses.
3. Nginx/OpenSSL with coprocess isolation, running in our Linux kernel that supports
coprocesses.
This partitioning enables us to separate the performance impact of the component
swapping from that of the increased complexity in the current macro.
The results of these measurements are summarized in Figure 6.3 and detailed in Table
6.3, which show each throughput measurement normalized and reported as a percentage of
native performance. Nginx/OpenSSL using coprocess isolation achieves up to 95% of the
throughput of the non-instrumented Nginx running on an unmodified kernel (native), which
is on par with previous systems’ performance [72, 38].
However, unlike its predecessors, the coprocess system shows decreased performance at
larger response body sizes. With 128 KB responses, ERIM achieved essentially the same
performance as native [72]. For ERIM, as more time was spent on I/O operations, fewer
contexts switches were performed per second, leading to a lower relative overhead. For
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Figure 6.3: Benchmarks comparing Nginx throughput with unmodified kernel; kernel with
coprocess support but unmodified Nginx/OpenSSL; and kernel with coprocess support and
instrumented versions of Nginx/OpenSSL.

Table 6.3: Throughput of Nginx running with and without coproc instrumentation on a
coproc-supporting kernel build, as a percentage of native throughput. Native throughput is
measured using an equivalent Nginx build on an unmodified Linux kernel.
Request
Size
0
1
2
4
8
16
32
64
128

KB
KB
KB
KB
KB
KB
KB
KB
KB

Native
(req/s)

Coproc
disabled

Coproc
enabled

24169
22779
21206
20376
19178
16356
12214
7830
4583

98.7%
97.9%
96.7%
97.6%
94.2%
93.0%
90.9%
91.9%
91.1%

95.8%
95.6%
94.2%
97.0%
94.4%
89.9%
88.1%
90.3%
91.1%
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coprocesses, throughput increases modestly at first as web page sizes increase (up to about 2
KB) then falls and plateaus to about 90% by 64 KB responses. We explain this as a result of
the current modification overhead, which adds additional overhead to the kernel code that
handles the I/O. With more time spent in kernel space reading network data, the added
overhead of repeatedly looking up possible coprocesses in current overshadows the time
saved by fewer context switches. This explanation is consistent with our observation that
the gap between the isolated Nginx instance and the non-isolated Nginx instance running in
the coproc-enabled kernel does shrink to essentially zero as response size increases. Thus,
the entire overhead experienced at the 128 KB response size is entirely due to the kernel
changes, not the actual cost of context switching.

6.4

Limitations and Future Work

One limitation of the coprocess design is in the potential for unexpected side effects that
result from decoupling intra-process resources by default. We encountered this problem in a
bug affecting stored FPU contexts, which we detail in Section 6.2.4. As this example showed,
such bugs can also have security implications. Still, we believe that the potential for these
edge cases is substantially outweighed by the overwhelming number of possible unintended
violations of intra-process security boundaries that would otherwise exist within the kernel.
Our measurements also revealed a substantial performance limitation of this prototype.
The added complexity of the oft-used current macro incurred measurable overhead,
especially for I/O heavy workloads. However, we note that this implementation choice is not
central to the coprocess design. Rather, as future work it would be possible to avoid this
cost by looking up and storing the appropriate task struct only once on all entries to the
kernel.

6.4.1

Simplifying Integration

A significant barrier to adoption for all exploit mitigation technologies, arguably even more
important than performance overhead, is the complexity of actually integrating with existing
software. Developer time is valuable, and organizations may be reluctant to spend much time
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on adding new security measures. So, there is a real need for researchers to design mitigations
that are efficient not only in terms of computing resources, but also in developer resources.
Library-Level Isolation
One strategy for easing adoption could be to align intra-process components with preexisting
units such as dynamic libraries.

Dynamically-linked libraries already function as self-

contained units to some extent, which may make it easier to isolate them from the main
application.
Already, the dynamic linker populates a global offset table (GOT) with function pointers
to library routines used by the main executable. All calls from the executable to the library
use this GOT. A modified linker could instead inject call gates that perform a context switch
before invoking any library procedure, and switch back before a return.
Likewise, memory allocations performed by the isolated library could be intercepted by
the linker and placed in an isolated heap. In this way, an entire library could be isolated
without any changes at all. It would even be possible to isolate a binary shared library
without source code.
For libraries that only expose opaque data structures and don’t expect the user to directly
access any library-allocated memory, this approach could isolate security-sensitive libraries
without modification. Where libraries do need the user to have direct access to some allocated
memory, the developer could mark that allocation to use a non-isolated heap.
Library-level isolation does have real challenges. For example, a library that exposes
a function as general-purpose as memcpy or printf is not really isolated at all if the user
can invoke these functions with arbitrary arguments and have them execute in the trusted
component. But, for libraries that are small and handle security-critical data, library-level
isolation may make sense. These libraries would still have to account for the isolation in some
ways, such as by treating function arguments as untrusted and validating them accordingly.
But, these libraries would not have to concern themselves with the implementation details
of any particular form of isolation.
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Automatic Instrumentation for Critical Fields
Another possibility is to allow developers to designate only certain security sensitive fields,
without having to manually locate the code that legitimately accesses them. Instead, a
compiler pass could identify pointer dereferences that may access protected fields, and
instrument the enclosing function to perform a context switch upon entry and before
returning. The developer would then be relieved of the burden of identifying the code
of the trusted component manually.
This approach may result in false positives where unnecessary context switches are
incurred, but it could still reduce the exposure of security-sensitive fields significantly. Future
work could test the feasibility of such a system and measure the security and performance
implications of these false positives.
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Chapter 7
Conclusion
In-process memory isolation extends traditional system security boundaries to restrict
memory accesses between discrete components within a single process.

Many possible

mechanisms have been researched for providing efficient intra-process isolation, but little
work has been done on how these systems might be attacked. Recent works propose using
a new hardware feature, Protection Keys for Userspace, to implement in-process memory
isolation with low context-switching overhead and no execution overhead [72] [38]. We use
these systems to explore possible vulnerabilities and challenges in implementing in-process
isolation securely.
We find common weakness in both prototypes that we examine, and develop proofof-concept exploits.

Many of the weaknesses stemmed from problems with the WˆX

assumption, some resulted from kernel confused-deputy attacks, and some were ordinary
bugs like race conditions that can be found in any software. Both systems relied on static
code invariants—properties of executable code that could be validated at load time and
maintained throughout execution. When the WˆX assumption is undermined, the static
code invariants can be violated. Kernel confused-deputy attacks are challenging to address
due to the immense scale of the kernel. The Linux kernel spans millions of lines of code
which were all written without a thought towards intra-process isolation, and many interfaces
violate the intra-process security model. While known loopholes are mostly easy to fix, a
better method is needed to ensure that none are overlooked.
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We go on to examine the WˆX assumption in the context of another form of intraprocess isolation, control-flow integrity (CFI). We show that one of the attacks, the proc/mem
attack, is also applicable to these systems because they share the same flawed conception
of the WˆX assumption. Again, we develop a proof-of-concept exploit that shows that this
technique works under realistic assumptions in real-world software to bypass any fine-grained
static CFI with shadow stacks. This technique uses a data-only attack, leveraging file-offset
data-oriented gadgets to inject arbitrary executable code into the process at runtime. Such
file-offset data-oriented gadgets are present in both Nginx and the GNU standard C library,
suggesting that programs using the standard C library for file I/O may be vulnerable to this
technique.
In response to the apparent discrepancy between the WˆX assumption in theory and
in practice, we design and prototype the xlock system to instantiate the assumption on
Linux. We found that we could eliminate much of the known attack surface by converting
all code mappings to be non-writable, private, and anonymous. The remaining interfaces
that violate the WˆX assumption were discovered and patched through static analysis. We
test the xlock system on real software and find that it adds no runtime overhead and has a
modest memory footprint.
We then synthesize the preceding results to design a hybrid model for intra-process
isolation that delegates context switches purely to userspace, but enforces inter-component
boundaries in the kernel by transparently treating each component as a different process.
When used in conjuction with the xlock system, we believe this system mitigates all known
vulnerabilities in existing PKU-based intra-process isolation systems. Furthermore, it does
so in a systemic way that addresses the root causes of the weaknesses rather than engage in
a game of whack-a-mole with individual bugs.
Finally, we compare performance of the coprocess prototype in protecting a web server’s
private keys. Total throughput of Nginx using coprocess isolation was measured at 90% as
compared to native. Unlike ERIM, coprocesses experienced decreased throughput at higher
response page sizes. The lower throughput at larger response sizes is accounted for by the
added complexity of the current macro in the coprocess-enabled kernel. We expect that this
inefficiency could be almost completely resolved with additional optimization. We conclude
92

that coprocesses with xlock are a feasible solution for a more robustly secure intra-process
isolation system.
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[34] Johannes Götzfried, Moritz Eckert, Sebastian Schinzel, and Tilo Müller. Cache attacks
on Intel SGX. In Proceedings of the 10th European Workshop on Systems Security,
page 2. ACM, 2017. 13
[35] Ben Gras, Kaveh Razavi, Erik Bosman, Herbert Bos, and Cristiano Giuffrida. ASLR
on the line: Practical cache attacks on the MMU. In NDSS, volume 17, page 26, 2017.
12
[36] Daniel Gruss, Clémentine Maurice, Anders Fogh, Moritz Lipp, and Stefan Mangard.
Prefetch side-channel attacks: Bypassing SMAP and kernel ASLR. In Proceedings of
the 2016 ACM SIGSAC conference on computer and communications security, pages
368–379. ACM, 2016. 12

97

[37] Dave Hansen. PATCH 01/33: mm: introduce get user pages remote(). Linux Kernel
Patch: https://lkml.org/lkml/2016/2/12/612, 2016. 4, 39
[38] Mohammad Hedayati, Spyridoula Gravani, Ethan Johnson, John Criswell, Michael L
Scott, Kai Shen, and Mike Marty. Hodor: Intra-Process Isolation for High-Throughput
Data Plane Libraries. In 2019 USENIX Annual Technical Conference (USENIX ACT
19), 2019. 2, 10, 11, 14, 18, 74, 75, 86, 91
[39] H. Hu, S. Shinde, S. Adrian, Z. L. Chua, P. Saxena, and Z. Liang. Data-oriented
programming: On the expressiveness of non-control data attacks.

In 2016 IEEE

Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP), pages 969–986, 2016.
[40] Hong Hu, Zheng Leong Chua, Sendroiu Adrian, Prateek Saxena, and Zhenkai Liang.
Automatic generation of data-oriented exploits. In 24th USENIX Security Symposium
(USENIX Security 15), pages 177–192, 2015. 49, 51, 56, 57
[41] Ralf Hund, Carsten Willems, and Thorsten Holz. Practical timing side channel attacks
against kernel space ASLR. In 2013 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, pages
191–205. IEEE, 2013. 12
[42] Intel. Intel R software guard extensions programming reference: https://software.
intel.com/sites/default/files/managed/48/88/329298-002.pdf, 2014. 12
[43] Intel. Intel 64 and IA-32 Architectures Software Developer Manuals, 2019. 2, 7, 12, 13,
14
[44] Vasileios P Kemerlis, Michalis Polychronakis, and Angelos D Keromytis.

ret2dir:

Rethinking kernel isolation. In 23rd USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security
14), pages 957–972, 2014. 72
[45] P. Kocher, J. Horn, A. Fogh, D. Genkin, D. Gruss, W. Haas, M. Hamburg, M. Lipp,
S. Mangard, T. Prescher, M. Schwarz, and Y. Yarom. Spectre attacks: Exploiting
speculative execution. In 2019 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP), pages
1–19, May 2019. 21

98

[46] Koen Koning, Xi Chen, Herbert Bos, Cristiano Giuffrida, and Elias Athanasopoulos.
No need to hide: Protecting safe regions on commodity hardware. In Proceedings of the
Twelfth European Conference on Computer Systems, pages 437–452. ACM, 2017. 1, 11,
12, 13, 14, 74
[47] Istvan Kurucsai.

CVE-2019-5786 Exploit.

https://github.com/exodusintel/

CVE-2019-5786, 2019. 49
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